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Semantic Security and the Second-Largest
Eigenvalue of Biregular Graphs
Moritz Wiese and Holger Boche
Abstract
It is investigated how to achieve semantic security for the wiretap channel. It is shown that
asymptotically, every rate achievable with strong secrecy is also achievable with semantic security if
the strong secrecy information leakage decreases sufficiently fast. If the decrease is slow, this continues
to hold with a weaker formulation of semantic security. A new type of functions called biregular
irreducible (BRI) functions, similar to universal hash functions, is introduced. BRI functions provide a
universal method of establishing secrecy. It is proved that the known secrecy rates of any discrete and
Gaussian wiretap channel are achievable with semantic security by modular wiretap codes constructed
from a BRI function and an error-correcting code. A concrete universal hash function given by finite-
field arithmetic can be converted into a BRI function for certain parameters. A characterization of
BRI functions in terms of edge-disjoint biregular graphs on a common vertex set is derived. New BRI
functions are constructed from families of Ramanujan graphs. It is shown that BRI functions used in
modular schemes which achieve the semantic security capacity of discrete or Gaussian wiretap channels
should be nearly Ramanujan. Moreover, BRI functions are universal hash functions on average.
Index Terms
Semantic security, wiretap channel, modular coding scheme, biregular irreducible function, biregular
graph, second-largest eigenvalue, Ramanujan graph, Cayley sum graph
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivation
In the wiretap channel problem, a sender has a set of messages and would like to transmit
one of these messages to a receiver. To this end, the message is encoded and then sent through
M. Wiese and H. Boche are with the Institute of Theoretical Information Technology, Technical University of Munich, 80333
Mu¨nchen, Germany.
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2m ∈M f−1s φ T ψ fs mˆ ∈M
Fig. 1. The modular UHF or BRI scheme. T denotes the physical channel between sender and receiver. (φ, ψ) is an error-
correcting code and f is a universal hash function or a BRI function (to be defined). f−1s denotes the randomized inverse of
fs. The seed s has to be known to sender and receiver beforehand.
a noisy channel to the intended receiver, who decodes the channel output. An eavesdropper
observes a different noisy version of the sent codeword. The goal is to find an encoding of the
messages which allows a reliable transmission to the intended message recipient, whereas the
eavesdropper obtains no information about the transmitted message.
What it means that “no information” is obtained by the eavesdropper can be defined in multiple
ways using secrecy measures. In this paper, the secrecy measure of semantic security is focused
on. It is defined asymptotically as the coding blocklength n tends to infinity. For every n, a
finite message set Mn is given. Semantic security holds if maxMn I(Mn ∧ Zn) tends to zero,
whereMn ranges over all random variables onMn, Zn describes the eavesdropper’s observation
generated by Mn and I(X ∧ Y ) is the mutual information between random variables X and Y .
This paper studies modular schemes which enhance ordinary error-correcting codes (ECCs)
in order to provide semantic security against an eavesdropper. In a modular UHF scheme, the
randomized inverse of a universal hash function (UHF) is prefixed to the ECC encoder and the
UHF itself is postfixed to the ECC decoder, see Fig. 1. Recall that a universal hash function
is a function f : S × X → M such that P[f(S, x) = f(S, x′)] ≤ |M|−1 for S uniformly
distributed on S and for all x 6= x′. For a given seed s ∈ S and any m ∈ M, the randomized
inverse f−1s (m) uniformly at random chooses an element of the set {x : f(s, x) = m}. Reliable
transmission of messages chosen from M is possible due to the ECC if the seed is known to
the sender and the receiver.
It is shown by Bellare and Tessaro1 [3] and Tal and Vardy [39] that the ordinary secrecy
capacity of any discrete, degraded and symmetric wiretap channel as derived by Wyner [44] and
Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [17] is achievable by modular UHF schemes such that semantic security
is guaranteed. The proofs make heavy use of the symmetry of the wiretap channel. Since the
seed may be known to the eavesdropper, it can be generated and sent beforehand by the sender,
1[3] and [4] are unpublished extended versions of [5]. We only cite the more detailed unpublished papers.
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3which however reduces the achievable rate. It is shown in [3] that by reusing the seed not too
often, the rate loss due to seed transmission can be made negligible while preserving semantic
security.
Bellare and Tessaro also give the example of a finite-field arithmetic UHF β which is suit-
able for being used in modular UHF schemes and is efficiently computable and invertible. In
combination with an efficient linear code, the resulting modular UHF scheme is efficient as well
and provides a very practical and flexible way of achieving optimal rates and high security for
discrete, degraded and symmetric wiretap channels.
Tyagi and Vardy2 [40] show a leftover hash lemma for the modular UHF scheme. This lemma
bounds the mutual information between a uniformly distributed message on M on the one hand
and the pair of eavesdropper’s output and uniformly distributed seed on the other hand. Using
this lemma, it is shown that the modular UHF scheme achieves the wiretap capacity with strong
secrecy if the wiretap channel is degraded, discrete and symmetric or Gaussian.
By Section II of the present paper, for any strongly secure wiretap code there must exist
a large subset of the message set such that the transmission of messages from this subset is
semantically secure. In this paper, UHFs are replaced by a new type of functions in the modular
coding scheme, called biregular irreducible (BRI) functions. A modular BRI scheme provides
semantic security for a message set which is a subset of the image set of the BRI function. On
the message set, a BRI function has to have a certain regularity structure.
B. Contributions and overview
a) Section II: In this section, an abstract setting is considered. There is a sender and an
eavesdropper, both having access to a seed random variable S. The sender uses S to encode
a message, which is a random variable independent of S. The eavesdropper’s observation is
described by the outputs of a channel K whose inputs are the message and S. The channel
K could be, e.g., an encoder concatenated with the n-fold use of a physical channel to the
eavesdropper, but no such assumptions are necessary. It is shown that if I(M ∧ Z, S) is small
for uniformly distributed message M and Z generated by M and S via K, then there is a subset
M′ with |M′| ≥ |M|/2 such that I(M ∧ Z, S) is small for any message random variable M
2[40] is an unpublished, extended version of [41]. Since the latter does not provide all the results and details needed here,
we only cite [40].
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4on M′ and Z generated by M and S via K. Asymptotically, this means that a message rate
which is achievable with strong secrecy is also achievable with semantic security if I(M ∧Z, S)
decreases sufficiently fast. If the decrease is too slow, then semantic security holds in terms of
total variation distance instead of mutual information.
b) Section III: Instead of going deeper into the analysis of UHFs in order to find the
semantically secure message subset M′, we introduce a new class of functions called BRI
functions which replace the UHFs in modular coding schemes, thus giving rise to modular BRI
schemes. A BRI function is a function f : S × X → N together with a regularity set M⊂ N
which serves as the message set of the modular BRI scheme and on which f has to satisfy certain
regularity conditions. In particular, to every f and m ∈ M, a stochastic X × X matrix Pf,m is
associated whose (x, x′) entry is P[fS(x) = fS(x
′) = m] divided by a normalizing constant.
Now assume that some channel K : S ×M → Z describes the eavesdropper’s output given
that the message is first passed into the randomized inverse of the BRI function f using seed
S, and then transmitted through some channel W . (W could be the concatenation of error-
correcting encoder and physical channel T as in Fig. 1.) One of the central results of this paper,
inspired by the proof of the leftover hash lemma of Taygi and Vardy [40], is an upper bound
on ESD(K(·|S,m)‖Q) for every m ∈ M and some probability measure Q on Z, where D(·‖·)
denotes Kullback-Leibler divergence and ES is the expectation with respect to S. Using this
bound, the mutual information I(M ∧ Z, S) can be upper-bounded for any random variable M
onM and Z generated by M and S via K. The main term of this upper bound is the product of
the second-largest eigenvalue modulus λ2(f,m) of P (f,m) on the one hand and exp(I
ε
max(W ))
on the other hand, where Iεmax(W ) is the ε-smooth max-information of W introduced in [40]. In
particular, BRI functions provide a universal method of establishing secrecy for wiretap channels.
A last result of this section which is not needed in the rest of the paper is that BRI functions
are UHFs on average.
c) Section IV: This section contains the proof of the upper bound stated in Section III. It
first upper-bounds Kullback-Leibler divergence by Re´nyi 2-divergence. An upper bound on the
latter yields the result.
d) Section V: It is shown that for certain parameters, the finite-field arithmetic UHF β
mentioned before and used in [3] and [40] is a BRI function with a large and completely known
regularity set M and small λ2(β,m) for every m ∈ M. The analysis rests in large part on the
analysis of the eigenvalues of a family of Cayley sum graphs determined by β.
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5e) Section VI: Here it is shown that in fact, every BRI function f can be described in terms
of a family of biregular (bipartite) graphs. Every element m in the image of f induces a graph
Gf,m. The vertex set of Gf,m is S ∪ X and (s, x) are adjacent if f(s, x) = m. The definition
of BRI functions can be given an equivalent formulation by requiring Gf,m to be biregular and
connected for every m ∈ M. This allows the construction of new examples of BRI functions.
An important case is where every Gf,m is (d1, d2)-biregular and Ramanujan, which means that
the second-largest eigenvalue modulus of Gf,m is at most
√
d1 − 1+
√
d2 − 1. Based on results
of Marcus, Spielman and Srivastava [35], a BRI function can be constructed from a biregular
connected Ramanujan graph using repeated 2-lifts of graphs. This construction allows for more
flexible parameters than the BRI function β of the previous section, but so far is not explicit
because it relies on a refinement of the probabilistic method.
f) Section VII: Here some asymptotic consequences of the results of the previous sections
are drawn. It is shown that the wiretap capacity of arbitrary discrete and Gaussian wiretap
channels is achievable with semantic security by modular BRI schemes. The BRI functions
applied in these schemes should be nearly Ramanujan, and the maximum of the associated
degree pair has to grow exponentially in the blocklength. Suitable BRI functions constructed
from Ramanujan graphs are proven to exist. A consequence of the wiretap coding theorem is an
upper bound on the ratio of the size of the message set M of a BRI function and the maximal
λ2(f,m) over m ∈M.
g) Section VIII: This section concludes the paper with a summary and a discussion on
some practical aspects of BRI functions and modular BRI schemes, like the constructibility and
complexity of BRI functions.
C. Related literature
Semantic security was introduced in information theory by Bellare, Tessaro and Vardy [4],
[5]. It is a stronger requirement than strong secrecy as defined by Maurer [37] and Ahlswede
and Csisza´r [2], where the message is uniformly distributed. It is argued in [4] that semantic
security should be adopted as the standard secrecy measure in information-theoretic security, not
least because it is the information-theoretic analog to the cryptographic definition of semantic
security introduced by Goldwasser and Micali [25] (see also Goldreich’s book [24]).
Semantic security is shown implicitly in resolvability-based proofs of strong secrecy like in
Hayashi [26], Devetak [19] and Bloch and Laneman [9]. It is an explicit goal of random coding
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6in the resolvability-based works of Bunin et al. [12], Frey, Bjelakovic´ and Stan´czak [21] and
Goldfeld, Cuff and Permuter [22], [23].
The concept of universal hash function is due to Carter and Wegman [13]. UHFs were first
used in the context of information theory by Bennett, Brassard and Robert [6]. Modular UHF
schemes were proposed as a technique for wiretap coding by Hayashi [27]. The finite-field
arithmetic UHF β mentioned before which is the main example of a UHF in [3] and [40] seems
to go back to the work of Bennett et al. [7].
Liu, Yan and Ling [33] use polar codes to prove that the secrecy capacity of Gaussian wiretap
channels is achievable with semantic security. To the authors’ knowledge, no other codes apart
from modular UHF schemes, polar codes and random codes have been shown to achieve semantic
security for specific scenarios.
The first Ramanujan graphs were constructed independently by Lubotzky, Phillips and Sarnak
[34] and Margulis [36]. Ramanujan and nearly Ramanujan graphs are optimal or very good
expander graphs, respectively. Expanders are a very active field of research and have many
applications in mathematics, computer science and engineering. A good overview is by Hoory,
Linial and Wigderson [28].
D. Basic definitions and notation
For a set A and a subset B ⊂ A, by A \ B we mean the set difference of A and B. If
f : A → B is a function and b ∈ B, then f−1(b) denotes the preimage of b under f , i.e.,
f−1(b) = {a ∈ A : f(a) = b}. The randomized inverse of a BRI function (to be defined later)
has the same notation, but it should always be clear what is meant. If E is any event, then 1E
equals 1 if the event occurs and 0 otherwise. The logarithm log and the exponential function
exp will always be taken to base 2, the natural logarithm is denoted by ln.
The distribution of a random variable X is denoted by PX . If X, Y are random variables
with the joint distribution PXY , the conditional distribution of Y given X is written PY |X . The
distribution obtained by fixing a realization x of X is denoted by PY |X=x. If f maps realizations
of X to the real numbers, then EXf(X) is the expectation of the random variable f(X).
If X is any finite set, then RX denotes the set of real-valued functions on X . RX is isomorphic
to R|X |. Similarly, we will work with matrices from RS×X . A matrix is called stochastic if it
has nonnegative entries and the entries of every row sum to 1. A symmetric matrix A ∈ RX×X
is diagonalizable with real eigenvalues µ1 ≥ µ2 ≥ · · · ≥ µ|X |. In this situation, the algebraic
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7multiplicity of an eigenvalue is the same as its geometric multiplicity, and one can just speak of
its multiplicity. If A also has nonnegative entries and constant row sums (e.g., if it is stochastic),
then µ1 is an eigenvalue to the eigenvector 1, the all-one vector. For such a matrix, its second-
largest eigenvalue modulus is max(|µ2|, |µ|X ||), and if this is smaller than µ1, then µ1 is a simple
eigenvalue of A.
II. SEMANTIC SECURITY FROM STRONG SECRECY
In this section we first define the necessary probabilistic concepts like information measures
and channels. We then analyze the relation between strong secrecy and semantic security. Finally,
we introduce wiretap channels and wiretap codes.
A. Basic probability definitions
Let Z be a measurable space, i.e., Z is equipped with a sigma algebra, which is suppressed
in the notation. We will always assume that a probability measure P on Z has a density p with
respect to µ, i.e.,
P (Z ′) =
∫
Z′
p(z)µ(dz)
for measurable Z ′ ⊂ Z .
Example 1. If Z is a discrete set, then we will always assume that µ is the counting measure
defined by µ(Z ′) = |Z ′|. Every probability distribution on Z has a density with respect to µ
and
P (Z ′) =
∑
z∈Z′
p(z)µ(z) =
∑
z∈Z′
p(z).
Example 2. The Gaussian distribution on Z = R with mean a and variance σ2 has the usual
density
1√
2πσ2
e−
(z−a)2
2σ2 (1)
with respect to Lebesgue measure.
Example 3. If P has µ-density p and Q has ν-density q, then the product P ⊗Q of P and Q
has density r(z1, z2) = p(z1)q(z2) with respect to the product measure µ⊗ ν determined by the
rule (µ⊗ ν)(Z ′1 × Z ′2) = µ(Z ′1)ν(Z ′2).
November 20, 2018 DRAFT
8The total variation distance of P and Q is defined by
‖P −Q‖ = 2 sup
Z′
(
P (Z ′)−Q(Z ′)),
where the supremum is over measurable sets. Since we assume that P and Q both have a density
with respect to a measure µ, an alternative expression for ‖P −Q‖ is
‖P −Q‖ =
∫
|p(z)− q(z)|µ(dz), (2)
i.e., total variation distance is the L1 distance of the densities. The Kullback-Leibler divergence
of P and Q is given by
D(P‖Q) =


∫
p(z) log p(z)
q(z)
µ(dz) if µ(q = 0, p > 0) = 0,
+∞ else,
the Re´nyi 2-divergence of P and Q by
D2(P‖Q) =


∫ p(z)2
q(z)
µ(dz) if µ(q = 0, p > 0) = 0,
+∞ else.
If X and Y have joint distribution PXY , then the mutual information of X and Y is given by
I(X ∧ Y ) = D(PXY ‖PX ⊗ PY ).
We also introduce the entropy
H(X) = −
∫
pX(x) log pX(x)µ(dx),
where pX is the µ-density of X , and conditional entropy
H(X|Y ) =
∫
pY (y)H(X|y)ν(dy),
where pY is the ν-density of Y and the random variable X|y has distribution PX|Y=y. Then
I(X ∧ Y ) = H(X)−H(X|Y ).
With an additional correlated random variable S, such that the joint distribution of X, Y, S is
PXY S, let I(X ∧ Y |s) denote the mutual information of the random variables X and Y with
joint distribution PXY |S=s. Then the conditional mutual information of X and Y given S is
I(X ∧ Y |S) = ESI(X ∧ Y |S),
i.e., the mean of I(X ∧ Y |s) with respect to S.
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9Pinsker’s inequality states that
‖P −Q‖2 ≤ 1
2 ln 2
D(P‖Q).
If X is a random variable on the finite set X and Y an arbitrary random variable such that PXY
has a density, then using (2) it was shown in [32] that
I(X ∧ Y ) ≤ −‖PXY − PX ⊗ PY ‖ log ‖PXY − PX ⊗ PY ‖|X | . (3)
B. Channels
A channel3 W with input alphabet A and output alphabet Z assigns to every a ∈ A a
probability measure W (·|a) on Z . To indicate the input and output alphabets of a channel W ,
we will often write W : A → Z . This should not lead to confusion with the analogous notation
for functions. We will always assume that W (·|a) has a density w(·|a) with respect to some
reference measure µ on Z , i.e.,
W (Z ′|a) =
∫
Z′
w(z|a)µ(dz)
for every measurable Z ′ ⊂ Z .
Example 4. If both A and Z are finite, then W is a discrete channel. Like for probability
measures, the density is always taken with respect to the counting measure µ (see Example 1).
W then is determined by the stochastic matrix (w(z|a))a∈A,z∈Z satisfying
W (Z ′|a) =
∫
Z′
w(z|a)µ(dz) =
∑
z∈Z′
w(z|a)
for every subset Z ′ of Z .
Example 5. The additive Gaussian noise channel W with noise variance σ2 has A = Z = R.
If µ is the Lebesgue measure on Z and w the density of W with respect to µ, then w(z|a) is
given by (1).
Example 6. If the channel W : A → Z has density w with respect to the measure µ on Z , then
the blocklength-n memoryless extension W n of W has density
wn(zn|an) =
n∏
i=1
w(zi|ai)
3This definition of a channel does not encompass all concepts called “channel” in information theory. For example, channels
with states (random or arbitrary) are not channels in the sense of this paper.
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with respect to the n-fold product measure µ ⊗ · · · ⊗ µ, where an = (a1, . . . , an) and zn =
(z1, . . . , zn).
Example 7. The conditional probability PX|Y of a random variable X with respect to the random
variable Y is a channel.
Example 8. Any deterministic function φ : X → A is a channel.
If (X, Y ) is a pair of random variables on X × Y and PY |X can be described by a channel
W , then we say that Y is generated by X via W . If PX = P , then we often write I(X ∧ Y ) =
I(P,W ).
If V : X → Y is a discrete channel with density v, then the concatenation of V with the
arbitrary channel W : Y → Z is the channel W ◦ V : X → Z which has the µ-density
u(z|x) =
∑
y∈Y
w(z|y)v(y|x)
if W has the µ-density w. The concatenation can be defined analogously if Y is infinite, but
there is a finite set Y ′ ⊂ Y such that V (Y ′|x) = 1 for all x ∈ X .
C. Semantic security and strong secrecy
We will now give meaning to the claim that any strong secrecy rate also is a semantic
security rate, perhaps with a weak form of semantic security. We consider an abstract setting
not necessarily arising from the wiretap channel problem. Security is an asymptotic property,
the index n usually signifies blocklength. For each n, there is a finite set Mn of messages, a
set Zn to which the eavesdropper has access and a set of seeds which both the sender of the
message and the eavesdropper have access to. Every choice of a message and a seed generates
an eavesdropper observation in the set Zn via the channel Kn :Mn × Sn → Zn.
Definition 9. For every n, let Sn be uniformly distributed on Sn.
1) Strong secrecy holds ifMn is uniformly distributed onMn, independent of Sn and I(Mn∧
Zn, Sn)→ 0 as n→∞, where Zn is generated by Mn and Sn via Kn.
2) Semantic security holds if maxP
Mn
I(Mn ∧Zn, Sn)→ 0 as n→∞, where the maximum
ranges over all probability distributions on Mn, the message Mn is independent of Sn
and Zn is generated by Mn and Sn via Kn.
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Clearly, semantic security implies strong secrecy. The next theorem is the nonasymptotic core
of the proof that strong secrecy implies semantic security with the same asymptotic message rate.
The underlying message set is denoted byM and the seed set by S. A channel K :M×S → Z
determines the eavesdropper’s observations, who also knows the seed. The theorem is slightly
more general than needed since S is not required to be uniformly distributed here.
Theorem 10. Let M be uniformly distributed on M and independent of S, which may have an
arbitrary distribution on S. Assume that Z is generated by M and S via K. If I(M ∧Z, S) ≤ η
for some η > 0, then there exists a subset M′ of M with |M′| ≥ |M|/2 and
max
P
M
I(M ∧ Z, S) ≤ −4
√
η ln 2 log
4
√
η ln 2
|M′| ,
where the maximum is over all probability distributions PM on M′, M is independent of S and
Z is generated by M and S through K.
Proof. The theorem immediately follows from Lemmas 12 and 13 below.
The next corollary is an immediate consequence of Theorem 10 and formulates a necessary
condition under which the same asymptotic message rate is achievable with semantic security
as with strong secrecy.
Corollary 11. For every positive integer n let Mn be a message set, Sn a seed set and Kn :
Mn × Sn → Zn a channel to some measurable set Zn. Let (Mn, Sn) be uniformly distributed
on Mn × Sn and Zn generated by Mn and Sn via Kn. If strong secrecy holds such that
I(Mn ∧ Zn, Sn) ≤ ηn and
η˜n = −√ηn log
√
ηn
|Mn| −→ 0 (4)
as n tends to infinity, then every Mn contains a subset M′n such that
lim inf
n→∞
log|M′n|
n
= lim inf
n→∞
log|Mn|
n
and semantic security holds for the messages restricted to M′n, more precisely,
max
P
Mn
I(Mn ∧ Zn, Sn) ≤ η˜n −→ 0,
where Mn ranges over all possible random variables on the smaller message set M′n and Zn
is generated by Mn and Sn via Kn.
November 20, 2018 DRAFT
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Condition (4) yields conditions on the rate of decrease of I(Mn ∧ ZN , Sn) which depends
on the growth rate of |Mn|. For example, if the asymptotic message rate is positive, i.e., |Mn|
grows exponentially, then (4) is satisfied if n2I(Mn∧Zn, Sn) goes to zero. Generally, if the rate
of decrease of I(Mn ∧Zn, Sn) is not sufficiently large, then semantic security still holds if it is
formulated in terms of total variation distance instead of mutual information. More precisely, a
slightly weaker definition of semantic security is to require
max
P
Mn
‖PZnSnMn − PZnSn ⊗ PMn‖
to tend to zero. The proof of Lemma 13 shows that this can be inferred from strong secrecy no
matter what the rate of convergence to zero of I(Mn ∧ Zn, Sn) is.
Theorem 10 is proved with the following two lemmas.
Lemma 12. Let (M,S) be independent random variables on M×S such that M is uniformly
distributed and assume that Z is generated by M and S via K. If I(M ∧ Z, S) ≤ η for some
η > 0, then there exists a subset M′ of M such that |M′| ≥ |M|/2 and
ESD(PZ|S,M=m‖PZ|S) ≤ 2η
for every m ∈M′.
Proof. The independence of M and S implies I(M ∧ Z, S) = I(M ∧ Z|S). Moreover
I(M ∧ Z|S) = 1|M|
∑
m∈M
ESD(PZ|S,M=m‖PZ|S).
By choosing M′ to be the set of those m ∈M which satisfy
ESD(PZ|S,M=m‖PZ|S) ≤ 2η,
it is straightforward to see that |M′| ≥ |M|/2.
Lemma 13. If
ESD
(
K(·|S,m)‖V (·|S)) ≤ η (5)
for some channel V : S → Z and every m ∈M, then
ES‖K(·|S,m)−K(·|S,m′)‖ ≤ 2
√
2η ln 2 (6)
for all pairs m,m′ ∈M. In particular, if M is independent of S with an arbitrary distribution
on M and Z is generated by M and S via K, then
I(M ∧ Z, S) ≤ −2
√
2η ln 2 log
2
√
2η ln 2
|M′| . (7)
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Proof. To show that (5) implies (6), observe that
η > ESD
(
K(·|S,m)‖V (·|S)) (a)≥ 1
2 ln 2
ES‖K(·|S,m)− V (·|S)‖2, (8)
where (a) is an application of Pinsker’s inequality. Therefore
ES‖K(·|S,m)−K(·|S,m′)‖
(b)
≤ ES‖K(·|S,m)− V (·|S)‖+ ES‖V (·|S)−K(·|S,m′)‖
=
∑
s∈S
√
PS(s)
√
PS(s)‖K(·|s,m)− V (·‖s)‖+
∑
s∈S
√
PS(s)
√
PS(s)‖V (·|s)−K(·|s,m′)‖
(c)
≤
(∑
s∈S
PS(s)
) 1
2
(∑
s∈S
PS(s)‖K(·|s,m)− V (·|s)‖2
) 1
2
+
(∑
s∈S
PS(s)
) 1
2
(∑
s∈S
PS(s)‖V (·|s)−K(·|s,m′)‖2
) 1
2
=
(
ES‖K(·|S,m)− V (·|S)‖2
) 1
2 +
(
ES‖V (·‖S)−K(·|S,m′)‖2
) 1
2
(d)
≤
√
2η ln 2 +
√
2η ln 2,
where (b) is an application of the triangle inequality for total variation distance, (c) is the
Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, and (d) follows from (a). This proves (6).
Next we show (7). We have
‖PZSM − PZS ⊗ PM‖
(e)
≤
∑
m∈M
PM(m)ES‖PZ|S − PZ|S,M=m‖
(f)
≤
∑
m,m′∈M
PM(m)PM(m
′)ES‖PZ|S,M=m′ − PZ|S,M=m‖
(g)
≤
∑
m,m′∈M
PM(m)PM(m
′)2
√
2η ln 2
= 2
√
2η ln 2,
where (e) and (f) follow from the convexity of norms and (g) follows from (6). (7) now follows
using (3). This completes the proof.
Lemma 13 not only is part of the proof of Theorem 10. It will also be applied to derive the
semantic security of modular BRI schemes from a bound of the form (5).
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The arguments of this subsection, in particular Lemma 13, suggest that semantic security is a
property of messages: The set of messages which satisfy (5) is a message set with (nonasymp-
totic) semantic security. In contrast, for strong secrecy it is sufficient that the average over (5)
be small, hence it is a property of the message set.
D. Wiretap channels and capacities
The security results presented so far were formulated in an abstract scenario. The focus of
the rest of this work is on the wiretap channel problem, where the capacity of a wiretap channel
has to be found. In this subsection, wiretap channels and wiretap codes are defined.
A wiretap channel is determined by
1) a pair of channels (T : A → Y , U : A → Z), where A is an arbitrary set and Y and Z
are measurable spaces, and
2) a sequence (A′n)∞n=1 of sets such that A′n ⊂ An, called the input constraint sets. We say
a channel has no input constraints if A′n = An for all n.
T is the physical channel between the sender and the intended receiver and U is the physical
channel between the sender and the eavesdropper. The sequence (A′n) will usually be omitted
in the notation.
Given a wiretap channel (T, U), a (seeded) wiretap code with blocklength n consists of
1) a discrete channel ξ : S ×M→ A′n called the encoder channel, and
2) a measurable mapping ζ : S × Yn →M, the decoder.
In the special case |S| = 1, the seeded wiretap code (ξ, ζ) also is called an ordinary wiretap
code.
The code rate of a seeded wiretap code is given by log(|M|)/n. The (maximal) error incurred
by the wiretap code (ξ, ζ) is defined as
e(ξ, ζ) = max
m∈M
max
s∈S
(T n ◦ ξ)(Yn \ ζ−1s (m)|s,m),
where ζs(y) = ζ(s, y) for y ∈ Yn, ζ−1s (m) is the preimage of m under ζs and T n is the
blocklength-n memoryless extension of T . The semantic security information leakage of (ξ, ζ)
is
Lsem(ξ, ζ) = max
P
M
I(M ∧ Z, S),
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where the maximum ranges over all probability distributions on M, the seed S is uniformly
distributed on S and independent of M , and Z is generated by M and S via the channel Un ◦ ξ
(recall that Un denotes the blocklength-n memoryless extension of U).
A number r ≥ 0 is called an achievable semantic security rate if there exists an increasing
sequence n1 < n2 < · · · of positive integers and for every i a seeded wiretap code
ξi : Si ×Mi −→ A′ni, ζi : Si ×Yni −→Mi
of blocklength ni and code rate log(|Mi|)/ni such that
lim inf
i→∞
log|Mi|
ni
≥ r, (9)
lim
i→∞
e(ξi, ζi) = 0 (10)
lim
i→∞
Lsem(ξi, ζi) = 0. (11)
The supremum of all achievable semantic security rates is called the semantic security capacity
of the wiretap channel (T, U).
The definitions of achievable strong secrecy rate and strong secrecy capacity are analogous
to the above with the exception that in (11), the Lsem(ξi, ζi) is replaced by the strong secrecy
information leakage Lstr(ξi, ζi) = I(Mi ∧Zi, Si), where Mi is uniformly distributed on Mi and
independent of Si, and Zi is generated by Mi and Si via U
ni ◦ ξi.
The fact that the codes achieving a semantic security rate only have to be defined along a
blocklength subsequence means that this is an optimistic rate definition in Ahlswede’s termi-
nology [1]. A pessimistic formulation would require the codes to exist for every blocklength
and properties (9)-(11) to hold along the complete sequence of positive integers (possibly only
requiring strong secrecy instead of (11)). A pessimistic formulation is usual in information
theory, but the optimistic one is more appropriate when the codes are required to exhibit a
certain structure. For example, wiretap codes used in practice might come from a code family
equipped with a structure which is available for infinitely many, but not all blocklengths. This
will also be the case in our analysis of modular coding schemes.
Another possible variant in the definition of achievable rates and capacities is to allow only
ordinary codes instead of seeded ones. Definitions of wiretap channel capacity usually require
codes to be ordinary. The definition of achievable rate for seeded wiretap codes assumes that
the seed is known both to sender and intended receiver. If the seed is generated by the sender
and transmitted to the receiver before the actual message transmission, the achievable rate can
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be reduced considerably. We will see in Section VII that this rate reduction can be overcome by
reusing the seed.
Example 14. If both T : A → Y and U : A → Z are discrete channels, then the pair (T, U) is
called a discrete wiretap channel. Its pessimistic strong secrecy capacity without input constraints
achieved by ordinary codes is given by
max
(
I(R ∧ Y )− I(R ∧ Z)), (12)
where the maximum is over all finite sets R, channels ρ : R → A and random variables R
on R such that Y is generated by R via T ◦ ρ and Z is generated by R via U ◦ ρ (Csisza´r
[16]). An analysis of the converse to the coding theorem of the discrete wiretap channel shows
that the optimistic strong secrecy capacity with ordinary codes cannot exceed the pessimistic
one, so formula (12) remains true also for that case. Moreover, it follows from the results of
Wiese, No¨tzel and Boche [43] that even if seeded wiretap codes are allowed, no higher rate is
achievable.
Since the strong secrecy information leakage can be shown to tend to zero at exponential
speed for every achievable strong secrecy rate, condition (4) is satisfied for ordinary codes. Thus
by Corollary 11, (12) also equals the pessimistic as well as optimistic semantic security capacity
of (T, U) achievable by both seeded and ordinary codes.
Example 15. Let T : R → R and U : R → R be Gaussian channels with noise variances σ2T
and σ2U , respectively. For any Γ ≥ 0, the pair (T, U) is called a Gaussian wiretap channel with
input power constraint Γ if for every blocklength n, the input constraint set is given by the ball
Bn(
√
nΓ) = {a ∈ Rn : ‖a‖2 ≤ nΓ},
where ‖·‖ here denotes the Euclidean norm. The Gaussian wiretap channel with input power
constraint Γ has the pessimistic, ordinary-codes, strong secrecy capacity

1
2
log
(
1 + Γ
σ2
T
)
− 1
2
log
(
1 + Γ
σ2
U
)
, if σ2T ≥ σ2U ,
0 else,
(13)
as was shown, e.g., in [40]. Like in the previous example, the optimistic strong secrecy capacity is
also given by (13) if ordinary codes are applied. We are not aware of any results upper-bounding
the strong secrecy rates for the Gaussian wiretap channel achievable with seeded wiretap codes,
but we conjecture them to be no larger than (13) similar to the discrete case.
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The strong secrecy information leakage can also be shown to tend to zero at exponential speed
[40], and Corollary 11 can be applied to conclude that (13) is the largest achievable pessimistic
as well as optimistic semantic security rate when ordinary codes are used.
For the discrete wiretap channel, we will henceforth speak of the secrecy capacity given by
(12). For the Gaussian wiretap channel, we will call (13) the ordinary secrecy capacity of the
Gaussian wiretap channel.
III. BRI FUNCTIONS
By Corollary 11, every sequence of wiretap codes which ensures strong secrecy ensures
semantic security at the same asymptotic rate if condition (4) is satisfied and the message set
of every code in the sequence is reduced to a suitable large subset. However, the theorem only
is an existence statement, since it does not answer the question how to choose the semantically
secure message subsets. This is unsatisfactory from a practical point of view.
In this section, we introduce BRI functions which replace UHFs in the modular coding scheme
of Fig. 1. We formulate one of the central results of this paper, which is an upper bound on the
degree of security which BRI functions can offer in a modular BRI scheme. This bound will be
used in the asymptotic analysis to ensure semantic security with wiretap codes constructed from
BRI functions and error-correcting codes. The discussion of the efficiency of BRI functions is
postponed to the last section. The final result of this section is that BRI functions are UHFs on
average. This is noted just for comparison, it will not be used anywhere in this paper.
A. BRI functions and modular BRI schemes
Definition 16. A biregular irreducible (BRI) function is a function f : S × X → N , where
S,X ,N are finite sets, for which there exists a subset M of N such that for every m ∈M
1) S-regularity: |{x : f(s, x) = m}| = dS for some positive integer dS independent of s,
2) X -regularity:|{s : f(s, x) = m}| = dX for some positive integer dX independent of x,
3) Irreducibility: 1 is a simple eigenvalue of the stochastic matrix Pf,m on X ×X defined by
Pf,m(x, x
′) =
|{s : f(s, x) = f(s, x′) = m}|
dSdX
(14)
(see Lemma 17 for a proof that Pf,m really is a stochastic matrix).
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The second-largest eigenvalue modulus of Pf,m is denoted by λ2(f,m).M is called the regularity
set of f , log(|M|)/ log(|X |) is called the rate of f . For fixed s, we will sometimes write fs(x)
instead of f(s, x).
To prove that BRI functions are well-defined, we note the following lemma.
Lemma 17. For any BRI function f : S × X → N with regularity set M, the matrix Pf,m as
defined in (14) is a stochastic matrix for every m ∈M.
Proof. ∑
x′∈X
|{s : fs(x) = fs(x′) = m}| =
∑
s∈S
1{fs(x)=m}
∑
x′∈X
1{fs(x′)=m} = dSdX .
Thus every row sum of Pf,m equals 1.
A BRI function can be used together with an ECC to construct a wiretap code. Assume
(T : A → Y , U : A → Z) is a wiretap channel. T and U can be blocklength-n memoryless
extensions of other channels like in the definition of wiretap codes, but the construction is
nonasymptotic and further structure of T and U can be ignored. (The case that T and U are
memoryless extensions is considered in Section VII.) Let (φ, ψ) be an ECC4 with message set
X , i.e., φ is a mapping from X to A and ψ maps elements of Y back to X . Assume that (φ, ψ)
incurs a transmission error e(φ, ψ) at most ε > 0, meaning that
e(φ, ψ) = max
x∈X
T (ψ−1(x)|φ(x)) < ε.
Thus, elements of X can be transmitted from the sender to the intended receiver with a small
error probability. Additionally, let f : S ×X → N be a BRI function with regularity set M. By
some abuse of notation, for each s ∈ S we introduce a new channel denoted by f−1s :M→ X
and called the randomized inverse of fs whose transition probabilities are defined by
f−1s (x|m) =
1
dS
1{fs(x)=m}.
Thus given s and m, it chooses an element of the preimage set {x : fs(x) = m} at random.
The ECC (φ, ψ) and the BRI function f together define a seeded wiretap code (ξ : S ×M→
A, ζ : S × Y →M) by
ξ(a|s,m) = (φ ◦ f−1s )(a|m), ζ(s, y) = f(s, ψ(y)).
4We use the term error-correcting code to emphasize the difference to wiretap codes. Our use of the term implies that the
mapping of codewords to channel input sequences (channel modulation) is part of the code.
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This wiretap code is called a modular BRI scheme and denoted by Π(f, φ, ψ). Modular BRI
schemes are a formalization of the modular scheme depicted in Fig. 1 with UHFs replaced by
BRI functions. Clearly, the maximal error e(Π(f, φ, ψ)) = e(ξ, ζ) incurred by Π(f, φ, ψ) satisfies
e(Π(f, φ, ψ)) ≤ e(φ, ψ). (15)
We also define Lsem(Π(f, φ, ψ)) = Lsem(ξ, ζ) and Lstr(Π(f, φ, ψ)) = Lstr(ξ, ζ).
Clearly, the rate of the modular BRI scheme Π(f, φ, ψ) is determined by the rate which the
pair (φ, ψ) achieves over T together with the rate of f . Therefore the regularity set of f should
be large. On the other hand, it will be seen in Theorem 19 that the degree of security which
can be achieved by a BRI-prefix scheme depends on λ2(f,m), more precisely, λ2(f,m) should
be small. Thus we will be interested in making M as large as possible, but at the same time to
ensure a small λ2(f,m). Observe that
|M| ≤ min
( |X |
dS
,
|S|
dX
)
, (16)
which implies the upper bound
log|M|
log|X | ≤ min
(
1− log dS
log|X | ,
log|S| − log dX
log|X |
)
for the rate of f . The inequality (16) also implies
|S| ≥ dX |M|,
in particular, the seed of a BRI function has to be at least as long as the message.
Example 18. Let X = S = F∗2ℓ , the multiplicative group of the finite field with 2ℓ elements.
F2ℓ is an ℓ-dimensional vector space over F2. Let V and N be linear subspaces of this vector
space with dimV = b and dimN = k = ℓ− b such that V +N = F2ℓ . For s, x ∈ F∗2ℓ we define
β(s, x) = m if s · x ∈ V +m, (17)
where V +m = {v+m : v ∈ V}. We call β the seeded coset function determined by V and N .
We will show in Section V that there exist parameters b and k for which V,N can be chosen
such that β is a BRI function with large regularity set M and sufficiently small λ2(β,m).
If one chooses M = N , then one obtains the arithmetic seeded coset function βo. Choose
basis elements e1, . . . , eℓ of F2ℓ over F2 in such a way that e1, . . . , ek are a basis of N and
ek+1, . . . , eℓ are a basis of V . Then the corresponding βo obtains the form
βo(s, x) = (s · x)|k, (18)
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where every element x of F2ℓ is represented by the binary sequence of length ℓ given by its
coefficients in the basis e1, . . . , e2ℓ and x|k means the restriction of the coefficient sequence to
the first k bits, i.e., the coefficients of e1, . . . , ek. β
o was defined in [7] and proposed as a UHF
for modular UHF schemes used in wiretap coding by [3] and [40].
In order to obtain semantic security for a wider class of channels, N and V need to be
chosen more specifically, and the regularity set M has to be a nontrivial subset of N . Thus M
is the message set to which N has to be restricted in order to obtain semantic security. The
identification of M therefore is of utmost importance.
B. Security by BRI functions
In order to analyze the security offered by a BRI-prefix scheme Π(f, φ, ψ) for transmission
over a wiretap channel (T, U), the effect of prefixing f−1s to the channel
W = U ◦ φ : X −→ Z (19)
has to be investigated. We denote the output distribution induced on Z by the input m to the
channel W ◦ f−1s by (W ◦ f−1s )(m). This distribution has the µ-density
1
dS
∑
x:f(s,x)=m
w(z|x) (20)
if w is the µ-density of W . We also denote by Unif(X ) the uniform distribution on X and define
Unif(X )W as the probability distribution on Z with µ-density
1
|X |
∑
x∈X
w(z|x).
The central result for the security analysis of Π(f, φ, ψ) is an upper bound on ESD((W ◦
f−1s )(m)‖Unif(X )W ). The relevance of this expression becomes clear in view of Lemma 13.
The bound and its proof are inspired by the channel leftover hash lemma of Tyagi and Vardy
[40]. That W has a structure like in (19) is inessential for this bound.
Like in [40], the upper bound on the security of a modular BRI scheme involves the ε-smooth
max-information of subnormalized channels. A subnormalized channel W˜ with input alphabet X
and output alphabet Z (also written W˜ : X → Z in the following) satisfies the same properties
as a channel except that 0 ≤ W˜ (Z|x) < 1 is allowed, whereas W (Z|x) = 1 for channels.
To make the difference clear, we will sometimes call the channels defined in Subsection II-B
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ordinary channels. Every ordinary channel by definition also is a subnormalized channel. If w
is the density of W with respect to µ, then for any measurable subset T of X × Z ,
wT (z|x) = w(z|x)1{(x,z)∈T } (21)
defines the µ-density of a subnormalized channel WT : X → Z .
The max-information of a subnormalized channel W˜ : X → Z with finite X is defined as
Imax(W˜ ) = log
∫
max
x∈X
w˜(z|x)µ(dz),
where w˜ is the density of W˜ with respect to µ. For ε > 0, the ε-smooth max-information of an
ordinary channel W : X → Z with finite X is defined as
Iεmax(W ) = inf
T
Imax(WT ),
where WT is defined as in (21) and T ranges over all subsets of X × Z satisfying
W ({z : (x, z) ∈ T }|x) ≥ 1− ε (22)
for all x ∈ X . The concepts of max-information and ε-smooth max-information go back to [40].
We can now formulate the central result on the degree of security provided by BRI functions.
Theorem 19. Let f : S × X → N be a BRI function with regularity set M⊂ N and let S be
uniformly distributed on S. Then for every m ∈M and 0 < ε < 1− e−1,
ESD
(
(W ◦ f−1S )(m)‖Unif(X )W
)
≤ 1
ln 2
λ2(f,m)2
Iεmax(W ) + log
|X |dX
|S|dS + ε log
|X |
dS
− (1− ε) log(1− ε).
Proof. See Section IV.
Denote the upper bound given in Theorem 19 by η(f,m,W ). From Theorem 39, where BRI
functions are characterized, it follows that |X |dX = |S|dS , which simplifies η(f,m,W ). Theorem
19 and Lemma 13 imply the following corollary.
Corollary 20. Let f : S × X → N be a BRI function with regularity set M and W : X → Z
a channel. Then
max
P
M
‖PZSM − PZS ⊗ PM‖ ≤ 2 max
m∈M
√
2η(f,m,W ) ln 2,
max
P
M
I(M ∧ Z, S) ≤ −2 max
m∈M
√
2η(f,m,W ) ln 2 log
2
√
2η(f,m,W ) ln 2
|M| .
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C. BRI functions and universal hash functions
To conclude this section, we examine the relation between BRI functions and UHFs. A UHF
is a function f : S × X → N which satisfies
P[fS(x) = fS(x
′)] ≤ 1|N | (23)
if S is uniformly distributed on the index set S and x 6= x′, where fs(x) = f(s, x). A natural
question is whether a BRI function is a universal hash function under the condition that the
common value of fs(x) and fs(x
′) is an element of M and that the right-hand side of (23) is
replaced by 1/|M|. One obtains the following average result, which is not needed in this paper.
Lemma 21. If f : S × X → N is a BRI function with regularity set M, then
1
|X | − 1
∑
x′ 6=x
P[fS(x) = fS(x
′)|fS(x) ∈M] = dS − 1|X | − 1 ≤
1
|M| .
Proof. Observe that
P[fS(x) ∈M] =
∑
m∈M
|{s : fs(x) = m}|
|S| =
|M|dX
|S| . (24)
Therefore
1
|X | − 1
∑
x′ 6=x
P[fS(x) = fS(x
′)|fS(x) ∈ M]
=
1
|X | − 1
∑
x′ 6=x
P[fS(x) = fS(x
′) ∈M]
P[fS(x) ∈ M]
(a)
=
1
|X | − 1
∑
m∈M
∑
x′ 6=x|{s : fs(x) = fs(x′) = m}|
|M|dX
(b)
=
(dS − 1)dX
(|X | − 1)dX
(c)
≤ dS − 1
dS |M| − 1
≤ 1|M| ,
where (a) is due to (24), (b) holds due to Lemma 17 and (c) is due to (16).
IV. PROOF OF THEOREM 19
The proof of Theorem 19 is divided into four subsections. The first one introduces a few
auxiliary concepts and results, the second subsection reduces the statement of the theorem to
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one about subnormalized channels, the main calculation is done in the third subsection, and
these three parts are put together in the concluding subsection.
A. Auxiliary definitions and results
a) Kullback-Leibler divergence and Re´nyi 2-divergence for subnormalized channels: In
order to obtain the ε-smooth max-information in the upper bound from Theorem 19, one has to
pass from W to subnormalized versions of W . Here we introduce a version of Kullback-Leibler
divergence and Re´nyi 2-divergence for subnormalized measures and densities. They appear during
the proof of Theorem 19.
Assume that f, g : Z → R are nonnegative functions on a measurable set Z which are
integrable with respect to µ, and assume that
Zf :=
∫
f dµ, Zg :=
∫
g dµ (25)
both are positive. Then the Kullback-Leibler divergence of f and g is defined by
D(f‖g) = Zf
(
D
(
f
Zf
∥∥∥∥ gZg
)
+ log
Zf
Zg
)
,
where f/Zf and g/Zg here denote the corresponding probability measures. The Re´nyi 2-divergence
of f and g is given by
D2(f‖g) = D2
(
f
Zf
∥∥∥∥ gZg
)
+ 2 logZf − logZg.
It is straightforward to see that
D(f‖g) =
∫
f log
f
g
dµ, D2(f‖g) =
∫
f 2
g
dµ
if µ(f > 0, g = 0) = 0. If M1,M2 are finite nontrivial measures on Z with respective µ-densities
f, g, then we define
D(M1‖M2) = D(f‖g), D2(M1‖M2) = D2(f‖g). (26)
It is well-known that Kullback-Leibler divergence is upper-bounded by Re´nyi 2-divergence
for probability measures [42]. This can be extended to the subnormalized case up to some error
terms.
Lemma 22. Let Z be a measurable space with measure µ and let f, g : E → R be nonnegative
integrable functions with Zf , Zg > 0 as in (25). Then
D(f‖g) ≤ Zf (D2(f‖g)− logZf) .
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Proof. See Appendix B.
The proof of Theorem 19 actually makes use of the following consequence of Lemma 22.
Lemma 23. Let Z be a measurable space with measure µ and S a random variable on the
finite set S. For every s ∈ S, let fs, gs : E → R be nonnegative integrable functions such that
Zgs > 0 and 1− ε ≤ Zfs ≤ 1 for some 0 < ε < 1− e−1. Then
ESD(fS‖gS) ≤ logES exp(D2(fS‖gS))− (1− ε) log(1− ε).
Proof.
ESD(fS‖gS)
(a)
≤ logES exp
(
D(fS‖gS)
)
(b)
≤ logES exp
(
ZfSD2(fS‖gS)− ZfS logZfS
)
(c)
≤ logES
[
exp
(
D2(fS‖gS)
)
(1− ε)−(1−ε)]
= logES exp
(
D2(fS‖gS)
)− (1− ε) log(1− ε),
where (a) is due to the convexity of the exponential function, (b) is a consequence of Lemma
22 and (c) follows from 1− ε ≤ Zfs ≤ 1 and the fact that the function t 7→ −t log t decreases
between e−1 and 1.
b) Second-largest eigenvalue modulus of stochastic matrices: The next lemma is a well-
known result about stochastic matrices.
Lemma 24. Let P ∈ RX×X be a symmetric stochastic matrix. If λ2 denotes the second-largest
eigenvalue modulus of P , then
w⊤Pw ≤ λ2
∑
x∈X
w(x)2 +
1
|X |
(∑
x∈X
w(x)
)2
for every w = (w(x))x∈X ∈ RX .
Proof. This result can be found in, e.g., [10]. A proof is included in Appendix B for the sake
of self-containedness.
B. Reduction to subnormalized channels
The following reduction to subnormalized channels is proved in exactly the same way in [40]
for UHFs instead of BRI functions.
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Lemma 25. Let T ⊂ X ×Z satisfy (22) for all x ∈ X . If S is uniformly distributed on S, then
ESD((W ◦ f−1S )(m)‖Unif(X )W ) ≤ ESD((WT ◦ f−1S )(m)‖Unif(X )WT ) + ε log
|X |
dS
, (27)
where the divergence on the right-hand side was defined in (26).
Proof. The density of (W ◦ f−1s )(m) is given in (20). Thus
ESD((W ◦ f−1S )(m)‖Unif(X )W )
=
1
dS |S|
∑
s∈S
∫ ∑
x:fs(x)=m
w(z|x) log
∑
x′:fs(x′)=m
w(z|x′)
dS |X |−1
∑
x′′∈X w(z|x′′)
µ(dz). (28)
The integrand in (28) equals∑
x∈X
w(z|x)1{fs(x)=m} log
∑
x′∈X w(z|x′)1{fs(x′)=m}
dS |X |−1
∑
x′′∈X w(z|x′′)
(a)
≤
∑
x:(x,z)∈T
w(z|x)1{fs(x)=m} log
∑
x′:(x′,z)∈T w(z|x′)1{fs(x′)=m}
dS |X |−1
∑
x′′:(x′′,z)∈T w(z|x′′)
+
∑
x:(x,z)/∈T
w(z|x)1{fs(x)=m} log
∑
x′:(x′,z)/∈T w(z|x′)1{fs(x′)=m}
dS |X |−1
∑
x′′:(x′′,z)/∈T w(z|x′′)
≤
∑
x∈X
wT (z|x)1{fs(x)=m} log
∑
x′∈X wT (z|x′)1{fs(x)=m}
dS |X |−1
∑
x′′∈X wT (z|x′′)
(29)
+
∑
x:(x,z)/∈T
w(z|x)1{fs(x)=m} log
|X |
dS
, (30)
where (a) is due to the log-sum inequality. If we denote the expression in (29) by g(s, z), then
clearly
1
dS |S|
∑
s∈S
∫
g(s, z)µ(dz)
exists and equals the expected divergence in (27). The term (30) is responsible for the error term
in (27) due to the assumption on T .
C. Eigenvalue upper bound on Re´nyi 2-divergence
In view of Lemmas 23 and 25, the main ingredient for the proof of Theorem 19 which
is still missing is an upper bound on the expected exponential Re´nyi 2-divergence between
(WT ◦ f−1S )(m) and Unif(X )WT .
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Lemma 26. Choose any measurable set T ⊂ X × Z such that WT (Z|x) > 0 for all x ∈ X .
For every BRI function f : S × X → N with regularity set M, every m ∈M satisfies
ES expD2
(
(WT ◦ f−1S )(m)‖Unif(X )WT
) ≤ |X |dX|S|dS
(
1 + λ2(f,m)2
Imax(WT )
)
.
Proof. With the Pf,m defined in (14),
ES expD2
(
(WT ◦ f−1S )(m)‖Unif(X )WT
)
(a)
=
1
|S|
∑
s∈S
∫ (d−1S ∑x:fs(x)=m wT (z|x))2
|X |−1∑x′′ wT (z|x′′) µ(dz)
=
|X |
d2S |S|
∫ ∑
s∈S
∑
x:fs(x)=m
wT (z|x)
∑
x′:fs(x′)=m
wT (z|x′)∑
x′′∈X wT (z|x′′)
µ(dz)
=
|X |
d2S |S|
∫ ∑
x∈X
wT (z|x)
∑
s:fs(x)=m
∑
x′:fs(x′)=m
wT (z|x′)∑
x′′∈X wT (z|x′′)
µ(dz)
=
|X |
d2S |S|
∫ ∑
x∈X
wT (z|x)
∑
x′∈X wT (z|x′)
∑
s∈S 1{fs(x)=fs(x′)=m}∑
x′′∈X wT (z|x′′)
µ(dz)
=
|X |
d2S |S|
∫ ∑
x,x′∈X wT (z|x)|{s : fs(x) = fs(x′) = m}|wT (z|x′)∑
x′′∈X wT (z|x′′)
µ(dz)
(b)
=
|X |dX
|S|dS
∫ ∑
x,x′ wT (z|x)Pf,m(x, x′)wT (z|x′)∑
x′′∈X wT (z|x′′)
µ(dz)
(c)
≤ |X |dX|S|dS
∫
λ2(f,m)
(∑
x∈X wT (z|x)2
)
+ |X |−1 (∑x′∈X wT (z|x′))2∑
x′′∈X wT (z|x′′)
µ(dz)
=
|X |dX
|S|dS
(
λ2(f,m)
∫ ∑
x∈X wT (z|x)2∑
x′′∈X wT (z|x′′)
µ(dz) +
1
|X |
∫ ∑
x′∈X
wT (z|x′)µ(dz)
)
(d)
≤ |X |dX|S|dS
(
λ2(f,m)
∫
max
x
wT (z|x)µ(dz) + 1
)
,
where the form of the density from (20) was inserted in (a) and the definition of Pf,m in (b), (c)
is due to Lemma 24 and (d) comes from Ho¨lder’s inequality
∑
x w(x)
2 ≤ (maxxw(x))
∑
xw(x).
November 20, 2018 DRAFT
27
D. Completion of the Proof
To complete the proof of Theorem 19, take 0 < ε ≤ 1 − e−1 and choose any subset T of
X ×Z which satisfies (22). It follows that
ESD
(
(W ◦ f−1S )(m)‖Unif(X )W
)
(a)
≤ ESD
(
(WT ◦ f−1S )(m)‖Unif(X )WT
)
+ ε log
|X |
dS
(b)
≤ logES exp
(
D2((WT ◦ f−1S )(m)‖Unif(X )WT )
)− (1− ε) log(1− ε) + ε log |X |
dS
(c)
≤ log
( |X |dS
|S|dS
(
1 + λ2(f,m)2
Imax(WT )
))− (1− ε) log(1− ε) + ε log |X |
dS
= log
(
1 + λ2(f,m)2
Imax(WT )
)
+ log
|X |dS
|S|dS − (1− ε) log(1− ε) + ε log
|X |
dS
(d)
≤ 1
ln 2
λ2(f,m)2
Imax(WT ) + log
|X |dS
|S|dS − (1− ε) log(1− ε) + ε log
|X |
dS
,
where (a) is due to Lemma 25, (b) is due to Lemma 23, (c) is due to Lemma 26 and (d) is
due to the fact that log(1 + t) ≤ t/ ln 2 for all positive t. By minimizing over T , one obtains
the desired upper bound. This completes the proof of Theorem 19.
V. SEMANTIC SECURITY WITH THE SEEDED COSET BRI FUNCTION
A. Conditions for β to be a BRI function
This section is devoted to a closer analysis of the seeded coset function β : F∗
2ℓ
× F∗
2ℓ
→ N
from Example 18. The main results are Theorem 28 and Corollary 29, where some combinations
of ℓ, k and subspaces V,N are found which make β a BRI function with large regularity set M
and small λ2(β,m) for every m ∈M.
To define the seeded coset functions which are good BRI functions, recall the following lemma
from finite field theory.
Lemma 27 (E.g., [31], Theorem 2.6). Let p be a prime number. Every subfield of Fpn has p
m
elements for some positive divisor m of n. Conversely, if m is a positive divisor of n, then there
is exactly one subfield of Fpn with p
m elements. In particular, the unique subfield of Fpn with
pm elements can be identified with Fpm .
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We can thus define a seeded coset function by choosing V to be the unique subspace of
F2ℓ over F2 which equals F2b for any b dividing ℓ. The properties of the corresponding β are
summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 28. Assume that b divides ℓ. Let V = F2b and let N be any linear subspace of
dimension k satisfying dim(N ∩ V) = 0. Define
M := {m ∈ N : F2b(m) = F2ℓ},
where F2b(m) is the smallest subfield of F2ℓ which contains F2b and m. Then the seeded coset
function β : F∗2ℓ × F∗2ℓ → N defined by V and N is a BRI function with regularity set M
satisfying
λ2(β,m) ≤
(
k
b
)2
2−b.
for every m ∈M. Moreover,
|M| = ℓ
b
N2b
(
ℓ
b
)
2−b, (31)
where
Nq(n) =
1
n
∑
d|n
µ(d)qn/d
is the number of monic5 irreducible polynomials of degree n over Fq and µ(d) is the Mo¨bius
function defined by
µ(d) =


1 n = 1,
(−1)k if n is the product of k distinct primes,
0 else.
Proof. See the next subsection.
Corollary 29. Let Z be any measurable space and S uniformly distributed on F∗2ℓ . Then for the
β from Theorem 28 and any channel W : F∗2ℓ → Z and every m ∈ M,
η(β,m,W ) ≤ 1
ln 2
(
k
b
)2
2I
ε
max(W )−b + ε log k − (1− ε) log(1− ε).
Proof of Corollary 29. β is symmetric, which implies |X | = |S| and dS = dX . It is also clear
that dS = |V| = 2b. Thus the corollary is an immediate consequence of Theorems 19 and 28.
5A polynomial is monic is its leading coefficient equals 1.
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Note that Corollary 29 gives almost the same bound on the expected divergence between
(W ◦ f−1S )(m) and Unif(X )W , uniformly in the message, as the leftover hash lemma of [40]
does on the mutual information between a uniformly distributed message M on the one hand
and the seed S and the eavesdropper’s observation (W ◦ f−1S )(M) on the other hand.
A drawback of Theorem 28 is that it only makes a statement for specific relations between
k and b (b has to divide b+ k). In particular, it does not say anything about the case k < b. In
Section VI, a new type of BRI functions is introduced which solves this problem.
The main reason for the inflexible relation of the parameters k and b for seeded coset functions
is that, to the authors’ knowledge, no analog to Lemma 35 below exists for arbitrary linear
subspaces V instead of subfields. However, recall that the modular scheme of Bellare and Tessaro
with the arithmetic seeded coset function βo has been shown to achieve strong secrecy, e.g., for
Gaussian wiretap channels. By Theorem 10, it must be possible to find a large message subset
for which ESD((W ◦ f−1S )(m)‖Q) is uniformly small in m for some probability measure Q on
Z . It remains an open problem to identify this message subset.
The following lemma sheds some light on the size of the regularity set M. It will become
important in the asymptotic analysis in Section VII.
Lemma 30. For all positive integers a and b, with k = (a− 1)b,
aN2b(a)2
−b ≥ 2k
(
1− 1
2ab/2−1
)
.
Proof. One easily shows that
Nq(n) ≥ 1
n
qn − q
n(q − 1)
(
qn/2 − 1).
for any prime power q and positive integer n, see also [31, Exercise 3.27]. Therefore
aN2b(a)2
−b ≥
(
2ab − 2
b
2b − 1
(
2ab/2 − 1)) 2−b
= 2k − 2
ab/2 − 1
2b − 1
= 2k
(
1− 2
ab/2 − 1
2ab − 2k
)
≥ 2k
(
1− 1
2ab/2−1
)
.
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B. Proof of Theorem 28
The proof of Theorem 28 has two parts. In the first one, it is shown that β is a BRI function
with regularity set M. The second part lower-bounds the cardinality of M.
a) β is a BRI function: First observe that β is dS-regular and dX -regular with dS = dX = 2
b
for all m ∈ N . Therefore it is possible to define a stochastic matrix Pβ,m like in the definition
of BRI functions for every m ∈ N . A central observation is that Pβ,m can be written as the
square of another stochastic matrix. This actually holds in a more general setting.
Lemma 31. Let X and N be finite sets. Assume that f : X 2 → N is a symmetric function, i.e.,
f(s, x) = f(x, s) for all (s, x) ∈ X 2, and that
|{x : f(s, x) = m}| = dX
for every s ∈ X and m ∈ N . For every m ∈ N , define the stochastic matrix Qf,m ∈ RX×X by
Qf,m(x, x
′) =
1
dX
1{fx(x′)=m}.
Then Pf,m = Q
2
f,m.
Proof.
Q2f,m(x, x
′) =
∑
s∈X
Qf,m(x, s)Qf,m(s, x
′)
=
1
d2X
∑
s∈X
1{fx(s)=fs(x′)=m}
(a)
=
|{s : fs(x) = fs(x′) = m}|
d2X
= Pf,m(x, x
′),
where (a) is due to the symmetry of f .
Now let β : F∗2ℓ × F∗2ℓ → N again be the Bellaro-Tessaro function defined in Theorem 28.
A consequence of Lemma 31 is that the analysis of the eigenvalue structure of Pβ,m is reduced
to the analysis of the eigenvalues of Qβ,m for every m ∈ N . Since Qβ,m has entries either
1/dX = 2
−b or 0, the matrix Aβ,m = 2
bQβ,m is the adjacency matrix of a graph on F
∗
2ℓ , which
we call Gβ,m (some basic facts and definitions about graphs are collected in Appendix A). Two
vertices x, x′ of Gβ,m are adjacent if βx(x
′) = m. Since β is symmetric, Gβ,m is well-defined, but
there may be loops, i.e., edges with the same start and end point (namely, if βx(x) = m). Gβ,m is
November 20, 2018 DRAFT
31
regular since every x ∈ F∗2ℓ is adjacent to |β−1x (m)| = 2b vertices. Thus the largest eigenvalue of
Aβ,m is 2
b. The multiplicity of this eigenvalue and the size of the other eigenvalues is determined
in the next lemma.
Lemma 32. For the seeded coset function β : F∗
2ℓ
× F∗
2ℓ
→ N with regularity set M defined in
Theorem 28 and for every m ∈M, the largest eigenvalue 2b of Aβ,m has multiplicity 1, and the
absolute value of every eigenvalue not equal to 2b is upper-bounded by k2b/2/b.
Corollary 33. For every m ∈ M, 1 is a simple eigenvalue of Pβ,m and the second-largest
eigenvalue modulus of Pβ,m satisfies
λ2(β,m) ≤
(
k
b
)2
2−b.
Proof of Corollary 33. Since Aβ,m has the largest eigenvalue 2
b with multiplicity 1, the largest
eigenvalue of Qβ,m is 1 with multiplicity 1 as well. Since the second-largest eigenvalue modulus
of Aβ,m is at most k2
b/2/b, the second-largest eigenvalue modulus of Qβ,m is at most k2
−b/2/b.
By Lemma 31, the eigenvalue 1 of Pβ,m also has multiplicity 1. Also, all other eigenvalues of
Pβ,m are upper-bounded in absolute value by k
22−b/b2, in particular,
λ2(β,m) ≤
(
k
b
)2
2−b
for every m ∈M.
The corollary implies that β is a BRI function with regularity set M. It remains to establish
Lemma 32. The proof is based on the fact that Gβ,m is isomorphic to a special Cayley sum
graph. A graph G on the set {0, . . . , n−1} is called a Cayley sum graph if there exists a subset
D of {0, . . . , n − 1} such that two numbers x, y ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1} are adjacent if and only if
their sum modulo n is contained in D.
Two vertices s, x are adjacent in Gβ,m if s · x ∈ F2b +m. Let α be a primitive element of
F2ℓ , i.e., α generates the multiplicative group F
∗
2ℓ
of F2ℓ . Such an α exists [31, Theorem 2.8].
Thus every nonzero element x of F2ℓ can be written x = α
a for some unique 0 ≤ a ≤ 2ℓ − 2.
In particular, there exists a set D = {d1, . . . , d2b} such that F2b +m = {αd1, . . . , αd2b} (clearly,
v +m 6= 0 for all v ∈ F2b since 0 is not contained in M). Two elements s = αa1 and x = αa2
are adjacent in Gβ,m if and only if a1 + a2 ∈ D (mod 2ℓ − 1). Therefore Gβ,m is isomorphic
to the Cayley sum graph on {0, . . . , 2ℓ − 2} determined by D. The eigenvalues of Gβ,m are
determined in the following general result on Cayley sum graphs which is due to Chung.
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Lemma 34 ([14], Lemma 2). Let G be a Cayley sum graph on {0, . . . , n − 1} determined by
the set D = {d1, . . . , dk}. Then its largest eigenvalue equals k. The other eigenvalues have the
form
±
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
d∈D
θd
∣∣∣∣∣ ,
where θ ranges over the n-th unit roots θ 6= ±1 with positive real part, and if n is even, an
additional eigenvalue is given by ∑
d∈D
(−1)d. (32)
Note that (32) is not an eigenvalue in our case because Gβ,m is a graph of 2
ℓ − 1 vertices.
Graphs like Gβ,m were already considered by Chung in [14], but explicitly so only with F2b
replaced by Fp with p prime and F2ℓ by Fpℓ. We give the general argument for completeness.
Chung used the following Lemma by Katz [29].
Lemma 35 ([29]). Let q be a prime power and t a nonnegative integer. Let ψ : F∗qt → C be
a nontrivial multiplicative character, i.e., a homomorphism from the multiplicative group F∗qt to
the unit circle {z ∈ C : |z| = 1} such that ψ(x) 6= 1 for some x ∈ F∗qt . Then for any m with
Fq(m) = Fqt , ∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
x∈Fq
ψ(x+m)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ (t− 1)
√
q.
To apply Katz’s lemma, let m ∈M, i.e., F2b(m) = F2ℓ . The mapping ψ : F∗2ℓ → C defined by
ψ(αa) = θa is a nontrivial multiplicative character of F∗
2ℓ
for every (2ℓ − 1)-th unit root θ 6= 1.
It follows that ∑
d∈D
θd =
∑
x′∈F
2b
+m
ψ(x′) =
∑
x∈F
2b
ψ(x−m).
Since F2b(−m) = F2b(m) = F2ℓ , we obtain that Aβ,m apart from the eigenvalue 2b has 2ℓ − 2
eigenvalues which are upper-bounded by(
ℓ
b
− 1
)
2b/2 =
k2b/2
b
.
The multiplicity of the eigenvalue 2b is 1. This proves Lemma 32 and completes the first part
of the proof of Theorem 28.
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b) Cardinality of M: To complete the proof of Theorem 28, it remains to compute the
cardinality of M. An m ∈ N does not generate F2ℓ over F2b (i.e., F2b(m) 6= F2ℓ) if and only
if it is contained in a strict subfield of F2ℓ containing F2b . By Lemma 27, every such subfield
equals F2t for some multiple t of b which divides ℓ. Therefore our goal is compute∣∣∣∣∣∣
⋃
t<ℓ:b|t|ℓ
(N ∩ F2t)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ , (33)
where a|b for positive integers a, b means that a divides b.
We denote the set of all multiples t of b which are strictly smaller than ℓ and divide ℓ by
{t1, . . . , tK}. We will need the following simple lemma.
Lemma 36. For any subset I of {1, . . . , K},
dim
(
N ∩
⋂
i∈I
F2ti
)
= dim
(⋂
i∈I
F2ti
)
− b.
Proof. Recall the formula
dim(V1 + V2) = dim(V1) + dim(V2)− dim(V1 ∩ V2). (34)
Then
dim
(
N ∩
⋂
i∈I
F2ti
)
(a)
= dim(N ) + dim
(⋂
i∈I
F2ti
)
− dim
(
N +
⋂
i∈I
F2ti
)
(b)
= k + dim
(⋂
i∈I
F2ti
)
− ℓ
= dim
(⋂
i∈I
F2ti
)
− b,
where (a) follows from (34) and (b) from the definition of N and the fact that ⋂i∈I F2ti contains
F2b , which implies that the sum of N and
⋂
i∈I F2ti equals F2ℓ .
The second lemma applied in the proof of (31) is a statement about those elements of F2ℓ
which generate F2b .
Lemma 37. The number of elements m of F2ℓ which are not contained in a strict subfield of
F2ℓ equals (ℓ/b)N2b(ℓ/b).
Proof. The elements of F2ℓ which generate F2ℓ over F2b are exactly the zeros of the monic
irreducible polynomials of degree ℓ/b with coefficients in F2b [31, Section 2.2]. The zero sets of
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these polynomials are disjoint, and every monic irreducible polynomial of degree d has exactly d
distinct zeros. Therefore the number of generators of F2ℓ over F2b equals ℓ/b times the number of
monic irreducible polynomials of degree ℓ/b over F2b , which is given by N2b(ℓ/b) [31, Theorem
3.25].
Now the calculation of (33) goes as follows:∣∣∣∣∣∣
⋃
t<ℓ:b|t|ℓ
(N ∩ F2t)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(a)
=
K∑
k=1
(−1)k+1
∑
I⊂{1,...,K}:
|I|=k
∣∣∣∣∣
⋂
i∈I
(N ∩ F2ti )
∣∣∣∣∣
(b)
= 2−b
K∑
k=1
(−1)k+1
∑
I⊂{1,...,K}:
|I|=k
∣∣∣∣∣
⋂
i∈I
F2ti
∣∣∣∣∣
(c)
= 2−b
∣∣∣∣∣∣
⋃
t<ℓ:b|t|ℓ
F2t
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(d)
= 2−b
(
2ℓ − ℓ
b
N2b
(
ℓ
b
))
= 2k − ℓ
b
N2b
(
ℓ
b
)
2−b, (35)
where (a) follows from the inclusion-exclusion formula, (b) is a consequence of Lemma 36, (c)
again is the inclusion-exclusion formula, and (d) follows from Lemma 37. Thus the cardinality
of M equals |N | = 2k minus (35), as claimed. The proof of Theorem 28 is complete.
VI. BRI FUNCTIONS AND GRAPHS
A. Characterization of BRI functions
The collection of graphs Gβ,m (m ∈ N ) in the previous section determined the function β in
such a way that β(s, x) = m if s is adjacent to x in Gβ,m. We will see that in a more general
way, BRI functions can be characterized using this relation.
Recall that some basic graph-theoretic terms are defined in Appendix A. Additionally, we call
a graph G bipartite if its vertex set is the union of two disjoint sets S and X such that every
edge in G has one vertex in S and one in X . The pair (S,X ) is called a bipartition of G. A
bipartite graph G with bipartition (S,X ) is called (dS , dX )-biregular6 if every element of S has
6Note that sometimes biregular graphs are defined without having to be bipartite.
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Fig. 2. The complete bipartite graph K{1,2,3},{4,5} is (2, 3)-biregular.
degree dS and every element of X has degree dX . If dS = dX = d, then the graph is bipartite
and d-regular.
The complete bipartite graph KS,X with bipartition (S,X ) is the graph on S ∪X where every
element of S is adjacent to every element of X , see Fig. 2. Clearly KS,X is (|X |, |S|)-biregular.
Every function f : S ×X → N is equivalent to a decomposition (Gm)m∈N of KS,X into edge-
disjoint subgraphs, where two vertices s ∈ S and x ∈ X are adjacent in Gm if f(s, x) = m. We
say that f is defined by the family (Gm)m∈N .
Theorem 38. A function f : S × X → N is a BRI function with regularity set M⊂ N if and
only if it is defined by a decomposition (Gm)m∈N of the complete bipartite graph KS,X into
edge-disjoint subgraphs such that Gm is (dS , dX )-biregular and connected
7 for every m ∈ M.
In this case, if λ2(Gm) is the second-largest eigenvalue modulus of the adjacency matrix of Gm,
then
λ2(f,m) =
λ2(Gm)
2
dSdX
< 1
for every m ∈M.
Proof. It is easy to see that the S- and X -regularity of f for every m ∈M is equivalent to the
(dS , dX )-biregularity of Gm. We can therefore concentrate on the equivalence of irreducibility
of f on M and the connectedness of Gm.
For any m ∈ M, let Am be the adjacency matrix of Gm. Since Gm is bipartite, it has the
form
Am =

 0 Bm
BTm 0


7See Appendix A for a definition of connectedness.
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for an X × S matrix Bm. The rows of Bm are indexed by the elements of X , the columns by
S, and the (x, s) entry (Bm)x,s of Bm equals 1 if s is adjacent to x in Gm and 0 otherwise. The
square of Am equals
A2m =

BmBTm 0
0 BTmBm

 .
Clearly, every eigenvalue of A2m also is an eigenvalue of bothBmB
T
m and B
T
mBm. Since rank(A
2
m) =
rank(BmB
T
m) + rank(B
T
mBm), A
2
m has the same eigenvalues as both BmB
T
m and B
T
mBm. It is
well-known that the eigenvalue multiplicities of BTmBm and BmB
T
m coincide. Therefore the
multiplicity of an eigenvalue for A2m equals twice the multiplicity of this eigenvalue for BmB
T
m.
The (x, x′) entry of BmB
T
m equals
(BmB
T
m)x,x′ =
∑
s∈S
(Bm)x,s(Bm)x′,s
=
∑
s∈S
1{f(s,x)=m}1{f(s,x′)=m}
= |{s ∈ S : fs(x) = fs(x′) = m}|.
Thus Pf,m = d
−1
S d
−1
X BmB
T
m, in particular, Pf,m is positive semidefinite. That 1 is a simple
eigenvalue of Pf,m therefore is equivalent to dSdX being a simple eigenvalue of BmB
T
m, and
consequently a double eigenvalue of A2m. This is the minimal possible multiplicity for this
eigenvalue, since the adjacency matrix of a (dS , dX )-biregular matrix always has eigenvalues
±√dSdX , and these are the maximal eigenvalues by absolute value (this follows from the Perron-
Frobenius theorem [11, Theorem 2.2.1] using the fact that
√
dSdX has the positive eigenvector
w with w(x) = 1 for x ∈ X and w(s) =√dS/dX for s ∈ S).
It remains to show that ±√dSdX being simple eigenvalues of Am is equivalent to Gm being
connected. Am can be written as a block diagonal matrix where every block is the adjacency
matrix of one connected component of Gm. Clearly, every connected component of Gm is a
(dS , dX )-biregular graph and therefore has the eigenvalues ±
√
dSdX . It follows that ±
√
dSdX
are simple eigenvalues of Am if and only if Gm is connected, and thus also that 1 is a simple
eigenvalue of Pf,m if and only if Gm is connected.
Now assume that f is a BRI function. Since the second-largest eigenvalue modulus of BmB
T
m
equals the second-largest eigenvalue modulus of Am by the above considerations, the formula for
λ2(f,m) follows. The final claim that λ2(f,m) < 1 for every m ∈M if f is a BRI function is
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immediate from the fact that Pf,m is positive semidefinite and the simplicity of 1 as an eigenvalue
of Pf,m.
From Theorem 38 it is possible to improve Theorem 19. If f : S ×X → N is a BRI function
with regularity set M defined by the decomposition (Gf,m)m∈N , then Gf,m is (dS , dX )-biregular
for every m ∈M. By a simple and well-known double-counting argument,
dX |X | =
∑
x∈X
∑
s∈S
1{s,x adjacent in Gf,m} =
∑
s∈S
∑
x∈X
1{s,x adjacent in Gf,m} = dS |S|. (36)
It follows
Theorem 39. Let f : S × X → N be a BRI function with regularity set M⊂ N and let S be
uniformly distributed on S. With the same notation as in Theorem 19, for every m ∈ M and
0 < ε < 1− e−1,
ESD((W ◦ f−1S )(m)‖Unif(X )W )
≤ 1
ln 2
λ2(f,m) 2
Iεmax(W ) + ε log
|X |
dS
− (1− ε) log(1− ε).
Remark 40. The use of bipartite graphs in the analysis of the seeded coset function β was not
necessary due to its symmetry in s and x. The adjacency matrices Aβ,m used in Lemma 32
correspond to the Bm used here.
B. Construction of BRI functions
Theorem 38 allows us to find new BRI functions through their graph-theoretic characterization.
In this section, new BRI functions are constructed which have more flexible rates than those
derived from a seeded coset function.
In view of the upper bound provided in Theorem 39, whether a BRI function f can provide
security depends on the relation between log λ2(f,m) and I
ε
max(W ). Since λ2(f,m) only depends
on f and Iεmax(W ) only depends on W , the goal is to find BRI functions with small λ2(f,m)
and large regularity set M. The precise relation between the two terms which is necessary for
security will be derived in the context of wiretap coding in the next section. As a hint as to what
can be expected from the graph-theoretic side, recall that a d-regular graph always has maximal
eigenvalue d, and d is the largest eigenvalue modulus. If a d-regular graph is bipartite, it also
has eigenvalue −d. Then by the Alon-Boppana bound [38], for every ε > 0 the second-largest
eigenvalue modulus of every sufficiently large connected d-regular graph is at least 2
√
d− 1−ε
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(with d fixed). The analogous statement for (dS , dX )-biregular graphs was shown by Feng and
Li [20], i.e., for every ε > 0, every sufficiently large connected (dS , dX )-biregular graph has a
second-largest eigenvalue modulus of at least
√
dS − 1 +
√
dX − 1− ε.
Ramanujan graphs are optimal with respect to the bounds of Alon-Boppana and Feng-Li,
respectively. A d-regular graph G with adjacency matrix A is called a Ramanujan graph if every
eigenvalue µ of A satisfies µ = ±d or |µ| ≤ 2√d− 1. A (dS , dX )-biregular Ramanujan graph
G with adjacency matrix A has the property that every eigenvalue µ of A satisfies µ = ±√dSdX
or |µ| ≤ √dS − 1 +
√
dX − 1. Ramanujan graphs were first constructed by Lubotzky, Phillips
and Sarnak [34] and Margulis [36]. Since then, other constructions have followed, see [35] for
hints to the literature.
There exist BRI functions f : S × X → N defined by a graph family (Gf,m)m∈N such that
Gf,m is a (dS , dX )-biregular Ramanujan graph for every m ∈M, and M is exponentially large.
Theorem 41. For every pair (dS , dX ) with dS , dX ≥ 3, every positive integer k and disjoint sets
S and X satisfying |S| = 2kdX and |X | = 2kdS , there exists a decomposition of KS,X into 2k
edge-disjoint connected (dS , dX )-biregular Ramanujan graphs.
Proof. See Subsection VI-C.
Corollary 42. For every pair (dS , dX ) with dS , dX ≥ 3 and every positive integer k there exists
a BRI function f : S × X →M with regularity set M satisfying
1) |S| = 2kdX and |X | = 2kdS and |M| = 2k,
2) λ2(f,m) ≤ (
√
dS − 1 +
√
dX − 1)2/(dSdX ) for every m ∈M.
Such a BRI function is called a Ramanujan BRI function.
Proof. For every m ∈M = {0, 1}k, let Gm be one of the 2k edge-disjoint connected (dS , dX )-
biregular bipartite Ramanujan graphs whose existence follows from Theorem 41. Define f :
S × X → M by setting f(s, x) = m if s is adjacent to x in Gm. Then f is well-defined
because the number of edges in KS,X is |S||X | = 22kdSdX , and the number of pairs (s, x)
which are adjacent in some Gm equals |M||S|dS = 22kdSdX . The statement about λ2(f,m)
follows immediately from Theorem 38 and the definition of biregular Ramanujan graphs.
The divergence bound of Theorem 39 obtains the following form for a Ramanujan BRI
function.
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Corollary 43. For a Ramanujan BRI function f : S × X →M as in Corollary 42,
ESD((W ◦ f−1S )(m)‖Unif(X )W )
≤ (
√
dS − 1 +
√
dX − 1)2
dSdX ln 2
2I
ε
max(W ) + ε log
|X |
dS
− (1− ε) log(1− ε).
The proof of Theorem 41 is based on a result by Marcus, Spielman and Srivastava [35] about
the existence of infinite families of biregular Ramanujan graphs for any given degree pair. This
existence result, however, relies on the probabilistic method and is not constructive. This clearly
is a disadvantage of Ramanujan BRI functions compared to the seeded coset function β.
C. Proof of Theorem 41
Marcus, Spielman and Srivastava in [35] use 2-lifts of graphs to iteratively construct large
Ramanujan graphs from smaller ones. Our addition is the observation that one obtains two
edge-disjoint Ramanujan graphs on a common vertex set in every step.
a) 2-lifts of graphs: For any graph G with vertex set V(G) and edge set E(G), define a
signing s to be a function s : E(G)→ {−1, 1}. We denote edges by their start and end vertices,
and when we write e = (x, y) ∈ E , then also e = (y, x) since we only consider undirected
graphs. In other words, s(x, y) = s(y, x) for all vertex pairs (x, y).
Given the signing s one defines a graph Gˆ called the 2-lift of G associated to s as follows. The
vertex set of Gˆ consists of two disjoint copies V0(G) and V1(G) of V(G), so that every x in V(G)
corresponds to vertices x0, x1 in V(Gˆ). For any edge (x, y) ∈ E(G), the edge set E(Gˆ) contains
edges (x0, y0) and (x1, y1) if s(x, y) = 1 and (x0, y1) and (x1, y0) if s(x, y) = −1. Observe that
if G is bipartite, then so is Gˆ, and if G is (d1, d2)-biregular, then Gˆ is (d1, d2)-biregular as well.
The signed adjacency matrix of G corresponding to the signing s is the symmetric matrix
As with rows and columns indexed by the vertices of G, where the (x, y) entry equals s(x, y)
if (x, y) ∈ E(G) and 0 else. Bilu and Linial derived the following result for signed adjacency
matrices.
Lemma 44 ([8], Lemma 3.1). Let A be the adjacency matrix of a graph G and As the signed
adjacency matrix associated with a 2-lift Gˆ. Then every eigenvalue of A and every eigenvalue
of As are eigenvalues of Gˆ. Furthermore, the multiplicity of each eigenvalue of Gˆ is the sum of
its multiplicities in A and As.
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This result implies that the negative −s of every signing s gives a 2-lift Gˆ− with the same
spectrum as the lift Gˆ obtained from s, and which in addition has no edges in common with Gˆ.
Lemma 45. If Gˆ is the 2-lift of a bipartite graph G associated to the signing s, then the 2-lift
Gˆ− of G associated to the signing −s has the same spectrum as Gˆ and is edge-disjoint from Gˆ.
Proof. Denote by Aˆ the adjacency matrix of Gˆ. Since Gˆ is bipartite, the spectrum of Aˆ is
symmetric about 0 including multiplicities (see, e.g., [11, Proposition 3.4.1]). Since G is bipartite,
the spectrum of A also is symmetric about 0. By Lemma 44, the spectrum of As must therefore
be symmetric about 0 as well. This implies that A−s = −As has the same spectrum as As, and
again by Lemma 44, the adjacency matrix Aˆ− of Gˆ− has the same spectrum as Aˆ.
That Gˆ− is edge-disjoint from Gˆ is obvious from the definition of 2-lifts.
The other ingredient to our construction is the following result due to Marcus, Spielman and
Srivastava.
Lemma 46 ([35]). For all d1, d2 ≥ 3 and every connected (d1, d2)-biregular Ramanujan graph
G there exists a signing s such that the 2-lift Gˆ of G associated to this signing is connected,
(d1, d2)-biregular and Ramanujan as well.
Proof. By Theorems 5.3 and 5.6 of [35]. The connectedness follows from the fact that G is
connected and that the eigenvalues of Gˆ which are not eigenvalues of G are bounded by
√
dS − 1 +
√
dX − 1, so that the eigenvalue
√
dSdX still has multiplicity 1. This was shown
to be equivalent to Gˆ being connected in the proof of Theorem 38.
b) Construction of graph family: Since the vertex set will change in the construction,
we notationally decouple the degrees from the vertex set and just call them d1, d2, where d1
corresponds to dS and d2 to dX . We start the construction with the complete bipartite graph
G0 = KS0,X0 on the disjoint union of sets S0 and X0 with |S0| = d2 and |X0| = d1. The adjacency
matrix of G0 has rank 2 and nonzero eigenvalues ±
√
d1d2. Therefore G0 is Ramanujan.
Recursively for every 1 ≤ t ≤ k and every sequence κ1, . . . , κt ∈ {−1, 1}t we define a
graph Gκ1,...,κt as follows. For any t ≥ 1, given κ1, . . . , κt−1, we set Gκ1,...,κt−1,1 to be any 2-
lift of Gκ1,...,κt−1 which is connected and Ramanujan. Its existence follows from Lemma 46. If
Gκ1,...,κt−1,1 is the 2-lift associated to the signing st of Gκ1,...,κt−1 , then Gκ1,...,κt−1,−1 is defined to
be the 2-lift of Gκ1,...,κt−1 associated to the signing −st of Gκ1,...,κt−1 . By Lemma 45, Gκ1,...,κt−1,−1
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is connected and Ramanujan as well and edge-disjoint from Gκ1,...,κt−1,1. Clearly, the vertex set
Vk of Gκ1,...,κk has a bipartition into a set of size 2kd1 and one of size 2kd2.
Lemma 47. Let k ≥ 1 and let (κ1, . . . , κk) 6= (κ′1, . . . , κ′k) ∈ {−1, 1}k. Then Gκ1,...,κk and
Gκ′1,...,κ′k have disjoint edge sets.
Proof. We prove this by induction. The claim follows from Lemma 45 for k = 1.
Assume k > 1 and the claim has been proven for every 1 ≤ t < k. If (κ1, . . . , κk−1) =
(κ′1, . . . , κ
′
k−1), then the claim follows from Lemma 45. We may therefore assume that (κ1, . . . , κk−1) 6=
(κ′1, . . . , κ
′
k−1).
For any element x of the common vertex set Vk of Gκ1,...,κk and Gκ′1,...,κ′k , denote by πk(x) the
element of Vk−1 of which x is a copy. By the definition of 2-lifts, two vertices x and y which
are adjacent in Gκ1,...,κk satisfy that πk(x) and πk(y) are adjacent in Gκ1,...,κk−1 . However, the
induction hypothesis and (κ1, . . . , κk−1) 6= (κ′1, . . . , κ′k−1) imply that πk(x) and πk(y) are not
adjacent in Gκ′1,...κ′k−1 . Therefore x and y cannot be adjacent in Gκ′1,...κ′k .
The proof of Theorem 41 is complete.
VII. ASYMPTOTIC CONSEQUENCES
Next we derive some asymptotic consequences of the results obtained in the previous sections.
We show in the first subsection that we can achieve the (ordinary) secrecy capacities of discrete
and Gaussian wiretap channels with ordinary wiretap codes constructed from ECCs and BRI
functions, given that suitable BRI functions exist. BRI functions with the required properties are
shown to exist in the second subsection, and their properties are analyzed. Finally, for any BRI
function f : S × X → N with regularity set M and sufficiently large X , the trade-off between
|M| and maxm∈M λ2(f,m) is characterized using the wiretap coding theorem.
A. Achievable rates with modular BRI schemes
Here we show that under the assumption that suitable BRI functions exist, the (ordinary)
secrecy capacities of discrete and Gaussian wiretap channels are achievable with modular BRI
schemes as well as with ordinary codes constructed from modular BRI schemes. We first recall
known upper bounds on the ε-smooth max-information of the discrete and the Gaussian wiretap
channel. Then we show that every ordinary-codes semantic security rate of the aforementioned
wiretap channels is achievable by modular BRI schemes which guarantee semantic security.
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In the final step, we construct ordinary wiretap codes from modular BRI schemes incurring a
negligible rate loss and degradation of error and semantic security information leakage.
a) Discrete and Gaussian max-informations: To apply Theorem 39 to discrete and Gaussian
wiretap channels, upper bounds on the respective ε-smooth max-information are needed. These
are provided in the next two lemmas due to Tyagi and Vardy [40]. For the first one, we need to
define δ-typical sets. If δ > 0, A is a finite set, P a probability distribution on A and n a positive
integer, then the δ-typical set T nP,δ of P is defined as the set of (a1, . . . , an) ∈ An satisfying∣∣∣∣ |{i : ai = a}|n − P (a)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ δ
for every a ∈ A and where P (a) = 0 implies {i : ai = a} = ∅.
Lemma 48 ([40], Lemma 5). Let U : A → Z be a discrete channel. For every n, let Xn be a
finite set and φn : Xn → An any function.
1) Assume there exists a δ > 0 and a probability distribution P on A such that φn(x) ∈ T nP,δ
for all n and all x ∈ Xn. Then there exists a positive constant c = c(|A|, |Z|) and a
positive γd = γd(δ, |Z|) which tends to 0 as δ tends to 0 such that
lim sup
n→∞
Iεnmax(U
n ◦ φn)
n
≤ I(P, U) + γd
for εn = 2
−ncδ2 .
2) If δ > 0 and the φn are arbitrary, then
lim sup
n→∞
Iεnmax(U
n ◦ φn)
n
≤ max
P
I(P, U) + γd
where P varies over the probability distributions on A and for the same εn and γd as in
1).
Lemma 49 ([40], Lemma 6). Let n be a positive integer, δ > 0 and set εn = e
−nδ2/8. If
U : R → R is a Gaussian channel with noise variance σ2 and φ : X → Rn is any function
satisfying
‖φ(x)‖2 ≤ nΓ
for all x ∈ X , then there exists a γG = γG(δ) such that
lim sup
n→∞
Iεnmax(U
n ◦ φ)
n
≤ 1
2
log
(
1 +
Γ
σ2
)
+ γG.
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b) Basic achievability results for modular BRI schemes: The next two lemmas are proved
under the assumption that BRI functions with the required properties exist. That this is indeed
the case will be shown in the next subsection. It should also be noted that these lemmas only
show the existence of seeded wiretap codes (given by modular BRI schemes).
Lemma 50. Let (T : A → Y , U : A → Z) be a discrete wiretap channel without input
constraints as defined in Example 14 and P a probability distribution onA satisfying I(P, T ) > 0
and I(P, U) < I(P, T ). Choose δ > 0 and 0 < δ′ < I(P, T )/(4− 2δ). Assume that there exists
an infinite sequence n1 < n2 < · · · of positive integers such that there exists a sequence
(fi : Si × Xi → Ni)∞i=1 of BRI functions, with Mi the regularity set of fi, satisfying
I(P, T )− δ
′
2
≥ lim inf
i→∞
log|Xi|
ni
≥ I(P, T )− δ′, (37)
lim inf
i→∞
log|Mi|
log|Xi| ≥ 1−
I(P, U)
I(P, T )
− δ, (38)
lim inf
i→∞
minm∈Mi(− log λ2(fi, m))
log|Xi| ≥
I(P, U)
I(P, T )
+
δ
2
. (39)
Then there exists a sequence ((φi, ψi))
∞
i=1 of error-correcting codes such that the sequence of
modular BRI schemes (Π(fi, φi, ψi))
∞
i=1 achieves a semantic security rate of (1 − δ)I(P, T ) −
I(P, U)− δ′. Moreover, both e(Π(fi, φi, ψi)) and Lsem(Π(fi, φi, ψi)) tend to zero at exponential
speed.
Proof. Recall the function γd defined in Lemma 48. Choose a δ1 > 0 satisfying γd(δ1, |Z|) <
δI(P, T )/4. By [18, Theorem 10.2] and the left-hand side of (37) there exists a sequence of
error-correcting codes (φi : Xi → Ani, ψi : Yni → Xi)∞i=1 which satisfies φi(Xi) ⊂ T niP,δ1 and for
which e(φi, ψi) converges to 0 at exponential speed.
We show that the sequence (Π(fi, φi, ψi))
∞
i=1 of modular BRI schemes has the claimed prop-
erties. That e(Π(fi, φi, ψi)) tends to 0 exponentially fast is clear from the corresponding property
of the ECC sequence and (15). The rate of Π(fi, φi, ψi) satisfies
lim inf
i→∞
log|Mi|
ni
= lim inf
i→∞
log|Mi|
log|Xi|
log|Xi|
ni
(a)
≥
(
lim inf
i→∞
log|Mi|
log|Xi|
)(
lim inf
i→∞
log|Xi|
ni
)
(b)
≥
(
1− I(P, U)
I(P, T )
− δ
)(
I(P, T )− δ′)
≥ (1− δ)I(P, T )− I(P, U)− δ′,
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where (a) is due to the positivity of the sequences and (b) follows from (37) and (38).
It remains to check whether semantic security is achieved. Write Wi = U
ni ◦ φi. For εi =
2−nicδ
2
1 , where c = c(|A|, |Z|) is the constant from Lemma 48, and m ∈Mi
lim sup
i→∞
Iεimax(Wi) + log λ2(fi, m)
ni
≤ lim sup
i→∞
Iεimax(Wi)
ni
+ lim sup
i→∞
log λ2(fi, m)
ni
(c)
≤ I(P, U) + γd − lim inf
i→∞
− log λ2(fi, m)
log|Xi|
log|Xi|
ni
(d)
≤ I(P, U)−
(
lim inf
i→∞
− log λ2(fi, m)
log|Xi|
)(
lim inf
i→∞
log|Xi|
ni
)
+ γd
(e)
≤ I(P, U)−
(
I(P, U)
I(P, T )
+
δ
2
)(
I(P, T )− δ′)+ γd (40)
(f)
= −δI(P, T )
4
+ γd (41)
(g)
< 0, (42)
where (c) follows from Lemma 50 with the γd = γd(δ1, |Z|) defined there, (d) is possible
because the involved sequences are positive, (e) is due to (39) and (37), (f) to the choice of
δ′ and (g) to the choice of δ1. Therefore λ2(fi, m) exp(I
εi
max(Wi)) tends to zero at exponential
speed. This together with the exponential decrease of εi, Theorem 39 and Corollary 20 implies
the exponential decrease of Lsem(Π(f, φ, ψ)).
There exists a result analogous to Lemma 50 for Gaussian wiretap channels.
Lemma 51. Let (T : A → Y , U : A → Z) be a Gaussian wiretap channel as defined in
Example 15, where σ2T is the noise variance of T and σ
2
U < σ
2
T is the noise variance of U and
Γ is the input power constraint. Let δ > 0 and 0 < δ′ < log(1 + Γ/σ2T )/(4− 2δ). Assume there
exists an infinite sequence n1 < n2 < · · · of positive integers such that there exists a sequence
(fi : Si × Xi → Ni) of BRI functions, with Mi the regularity set of fi, satisfying(
1 +
Γ
σ2T
)
− δ
′
2
≥ lim inf
n→∞
log|Xi|
ni
≥ 1
2
log
(
1 +
Γ
σ2T
)
− δ′,
lim inf
i→∞
log|Mi|
log|Xi| ≥ 1−
log(1 + Γ/σ2U )
log(1 + Γ/σ2T )
− δ
lim inf
i→∞
minm∈Mi(− log λ2(fi, m))
log|Xi| ≥
log(1 + Γ/σ2U)
log(1 + Γ/σ2T )
+
δ
2
.
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Then the sequence of BRI-prefix schemes (Π(fi, φi, ψi)) achieves a semantic security rate of
(1−δ) log(1+Γ/σ2T )− log(1+Γ/σ2U)−δ′. The sequences of errors e(Π(fi, φi, ψi)) and semantic
security information leakages Lsem(Π(fi, φi, ψi)) go to zero at exponential speed.
Proof. The proof is analogous to that of Lemma 50.
Corollary 52. If modular BRI schemes as required in Lemmas 50 and 51 exist for every
discrete and Gaussian wiretap channel, then the (ordinary) secrecy capacities (12) and (13)
are achievable by modular BRI schemes providing exponentially decreasing errors and semantic
security information leakages.
Proof. This is clear for the Gaussian wiretap channel. For discrete wiretap channels, it is
important that Lemma 50 is valid for all discrete wiretap channels. Thus if (T, U) is the given
discrete wiretap channel and ρ : R → A is a channel like in (12), then Lemma 50 can be applied
to the composite discrete wiretap channel (T ◦ ρ, U ◦ ρ). This shows that (12) is achievable by
modular BRI schemes.
For the Gaussian wiretap channel, the ECCs which can be applied in Lemma 51 as components
of a modular BRI scheme achieving (13) have to asymptotically achieve the capacity of the
channel between sender and intended receiver (without security requirements). For the discrete
memoryless wiretap channel, let the probability distribution P on A be a maximizer in (12). Then
any blocklength-n ECC (φ, ψ) applied in a modular BRI scheme whose rate is close to (12) has
to satisfy two conditions: it should achieve a rate close to I(P, T ), and Iεmax(U
n◦φ) ≈ nI(P, U).
The latter holds by Lemma 48 if φ is a constant-composition encoder in the sense that φ(x) ⊂ T nP,δ
for all x in the domain of φ, for some δ > 0.
c) From seeded to ordinary codes: Lemmas 50 and 51 are enough to show that the semantic
security rates (12) and (13) are achievable using modular BRI schemes. However, without further
modification, modular BRI schemes are seeded wiretap codes. Practically, this means a substantial
rate loss if the seed is generated anew by the sender and then transmitted to the receiver before
every use of the modular BRI scheme (recall that |S| ≥ |M|). By reusing the seed a linear
number of times, the rate loss can be made negligible while semantic security is maintained.
For a given wiretap channel (T : A → Y , U : A → Z), the ordinary wiretap codes considered
in the next theorem have the following structure. Let f : S × X → N be a BRI function with
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φ˜ Π(f, φ, ψ) Π(f, φ, ψ) · · · Π(f, φ, ψ)
1 2 . . . N
Fig. 3. Encoder structure of the ordinary wiretap code constructed from φ˜ encoding the seed and N -fold seed reuse in N
applications of Π(f, φ, ψ).
regularity set M. For two blocklengths n and n˜, let
φ˜ : S −→ A′n˜, ψ˜ : Y n˜ −→ S,
φ : X −→ A′n, φ : Yn −→ X
be two error-correcting codes. An ordinary wiretap code (ξ, ζ) is constructed from these com-
ponents. For some number N , the message set of (ξ, ζ) is MN and its blocklength is n˜+Nn.
The code is initialized by transmitting the random seed S to the intended receiver using (φ˜, ψ˜).
Then the modular BRI scheme Π(f, φ, ψ) is applied N times with the same seed S to transmit
the N components m1, . . . , mN of a message from MN , see Fig. 3.
Theorem 53. For both discrete and Gaussian wiretap channels, the rates (12) and (13), respec-
tively, are semantic security rates and achievable with ordinary wiretap codes of the structure
shown in Fig. 3, assuming BRI schemes exist which satisfy |S| ≤ |X | in addition to the
requirements of Lemmas 50 and 51.
Proof. Let (ξ, ζ) be the ordinary wiretap code constructed before the statement of the theorem.
Using |S| ≤ |X |, we may without loss of generality assume that n˜ ≤ n. The rate of (ξ, ζ) thus
equals
log|M|N
(N + 1)n
=
N
N + 1
log|M|
n
. (43)
Due to the union bound, its error satisfies
e(ξ, ζ) ≤ e(φ˜, ψ˜) +Ne(Π(f, φ, ψ)). (44)
To bound Lsem(ξ, ζ), fix a seed realization s. Denote by (M1, . . . ,MN) = M
N any random
variable onMN and let ZN = (Z1, . . . , ZN) be generated by MN via (Un ◦φ◦f−1s )N . It follows
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from the memorylessness of the discrete and Gaussian wiretap channels that PZN |MN ,S=s =
PNZ|M,S=s. Therefore
I(MN ∧ ZN |s) = H(ZN |s)−H(ZN |MN , s)
≤
N∑
j=1
(
H(Zj|s)−H(Zj|Mj, s)
)
=
N∑
j=1
I(Mj ∧ Zj|s), (45)
where the inequality is due to the chain rule of entropy [15, Theorem 8.6.2] and the fact that
PZN |MN ,S=s = P
N
Z|M,S=s. Taking the expectation with respect to S and maximizing over all
possible distributions of MN implies Lsem(ξ, ζ) ≤ NLsem(Π(f, φ, ψ)).
Now choose BRI functions fi : Si×Xi → Ni with regularity sets Mi as required in Lemmas
50 and 51. It follows that there exist blocklength-ni ECCs (φi, ψi) such that both e(Π(fi, φi, ψi))
and Lsem(Π(fi, φi, ψi)) tend to zero exponentially. Also choose ECCs (φ˜i, ψ˜i) of blocklengths
n˜i ≤ ni satisfying that e(φ˜i, ψ˜i) tends to zero at exponential speed. Let Ni = Ci for some positive
C. Denote the wiretap code constructed from these components as in Fig. 3 by (ξi, ζi) (where
Π(fi, φi, ψi) is used Ni times). Then by (43), the asymptotic rate achieved by the sequence
(ξi, ζi) equals
lim inf
i→∞
log|Mi|Ni
n˜+Nin
≥ lim inf
i→∞
log|Mi|
n
.
The asymptotic error and semantic security information leakages of (ξi, ζi) by (44) and (45)
satisfy
lim sup
i→∞
e(ξi, ζi) ≤ lim sup
i→∞
e(φ˜i, ψ˜i) +Ni lim sup
i→∞
e(Π(fi, φi, ψi)),
lim sup
i→∞
Lsem(ξi, ζi) ≤ NiLsem(Π(fi, φi, ψi)).
Thus the ordinary wiretap codes (ξi, ζi) achieve an asymptotically vanishing error and semantic
security information leakage while losing nothing in asymptotic rate.
B. BRI functions which achieve capacity
Here it is shown that BRI functions as required in Lemmas 50 and 51 indeed exist which
additionally satisfy |S| ≤ |X |. Another observation is that the maximum of the S and the X
degree have to grow exponentially in the blocklength for such BRI functions, and that these BRI
functions are nearly Ramanujan.
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a) Seeded coset BRI functions: BRI functions constructed from seeded coset functions as
in Section V have limited rate flexibility. For i ≥ 1, let βi : F∗2ℓi × F∗2ℓi → F2ki be a seeded
coset BRI function with regularity set Mi as in Theorem 28. It holds that dSi = dXi = 2bi
with bi = ℓi − ki, and bi divides ℓi. The symmetry of β implies |S| = |X |. By Lemma 30, the
cardinality of the regularity set can be bounded as
ki + log
(
1− 1
2ℓi/2−1
)
≤ log|Mi| ≤ ki.
Since ℓi has to tend to infinity, it holds that
lim inf
i→∞
log|Mi|
log|Xi| = lim infi→∞
ki
ℓi
(46)
lim inf
i→∞
minm∈Mi(− log λ2(βi, m))
log|Xi| = lim supi→∞
bi
ℓi
. (47)
Since the right-hand sides of (46) and (47) sum to 1, the achievable rate is directly coupled to the
limit superior of bi/ℓi. However, since bi divides ℓi, (47) equals the inverse of a positive integer,
say N . Therefore asymptotic achievable rate have the form 1− 1/N . In particular, seeded coset
BRI functions cannot provide security against eavesdroppers whose channel noise level is not
much worse than that of the channel to the intended message recipient.
b) Ramanujan BRI functions: Let (T : A → Y , U : A → Z) be a discrete or Gaussian
wiretap channel. Define
t = I(P, T ), r =
I(P, U)
I(P, T )
in the discrete case, (48)
t =
1
2
log(1 + Γ/σ2T ), r =
log(1 + Γ/σ2U )
log(1 + Γ/σ2T )
in the Gaussian case, (49)
where P,Γ, σ2U , σ
2
T are as in Lemma 50 and 51, respectively. One may assume r ≤ 1. For any
δ, δ′ > 0 choose di, ki, ni satisfying
t− δ′ ≤ ki
ni
≤ t− δ
′
2
,
r + 3δ/4
1− r − 3δ/4 <
log di
ki
<
r + δ
1− r − δ .
For every i, construct a Ramanujan BRI function with parameters ki and dSi = dXi = di as in
Theorem 41. Then |Si| = |Xi| and
t− δ
′
2
≥ log|Xi|
ni
≥ t− δ′.
Moreover,
log|Mi|
log|Xi| =
ki
ki + log di
≥ 1− r − δ
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and for di and thus ki sufficiently large,
minm∈Mi(− log λ2(fi, m))
log|Xi| =
2 log di − log(di − 1)− 2
ki + log di
≥ r + δ
2
.
Therefore the conditions of Lemmas 50 and 51 are satisfied. Note that the Ramanujan graphs
underlying the above construction of the Ramanujan BRI functions are regular with exponentially
increasing degree.
c) Exponential growth of degrees: Here it is shown that for BRI functions satisfying the
conditions of Lemmas 50 and 51, the maximum of the S-degree and the X -degree must grow
exponentially. We need the precise form of the Feng-Li bound.
Lemma 54 ([20]). If G is a (dS , dX )-biregular graph with diameter
8 ∆ ≥ 8, then the second-
largest eigenvalue modulus λ2(G) of G satisfies
λ2(G)
2 ≥ dS + dX − 2 + 2
√
(dS − 1)(dX − 1)
(
1− 1
∆− 1
)
.
If G is a connected (dS , dX )-biregular graph with dS , dX ≥ 2 and bipartition (S,X ), then it
is well-known that its diameter ∆ satisfies
∆ ≥ log(|X |+ |S|)
log(dS) + log(dX )
. (50)
This can be seen as follows: Starting from any vertex x in X , say, every other vertex of G can
be reached by a path starting in x. Due to the bipartiteness of G, an upper bound on the number
of vertices which can be reached from x in n steps is

d
n/2
S d
n/2
X if n even,
d
(n−1)/2
S d
(n+1)/2
X if n odd.
The expression if one starts in s ∈ S is analogous. Then a lower bound on ∆ is the smallest
n for which one of the above bounds is larger than |X | + |S|. A rough lower bound on this
minimum is given by (50).
The claim of exponential growth of max(dS , dX ) follows from Lemma 55 using the require-
ments of Lemmas 50 and 51, in particular, that |Xi| grows exponentially. Lemma 55 itself has
slightly weaker assumptions.
8The diameter of a graph is defined in Appendix A
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Lemma 55. Let (fi : Si × Xi → Ni)∞i=1 be a sequence of BRI functions satisfying
lim inf
i→∞
log|Mi|
log|Xi| ≥ r1, lim infi→∞
minm∈Mi(− log λ2(fi, m))
log|Xi| ≥ r2, (51)
for numbers r1, r2 > 0, where Mi is the regularity set of fi. We also assume that |Xi| increases
to infinity. Then there exists a real number a > 0 such that
lim inf
i→∞
logmax(dSi, dXi)
log|Xi| ≥ a.
Proof. Let fi be defined by the family (Gfi,m)m∈Mi . We first note that dS and dX must be at
least 2. Otherwise, say if dX = 1, then |S| = 1 due to the connectedness of Gfi,m. Thus all
Gfi,m coincide for m ∈ Mi, implying |Mi| = 1, in contradiction to the assumption that |Mi|
tends to infinity.
Let ∆fi,m be the diameter of Gfi,m. If there exist infinitely many i and for every such i an
m ∈Mi satisfying ∆fi,m ≤ 8, then for any 0 < δ < r1
logmax(dSi, dXi) ≥
log dSi + log dXi
2
(a)
≥ log(|Si|+ |Xi|)
16
(b)
≥ log(dSi + dXi) + log|Mi|
16
(c)
≥ r1 − δ
16
log|Xi|,
where (a) is due to the assumption ∆fi,m ≤ 8 and (50), (b) comes from (16) and (c) from (51)
if i is sufficiently large.
If ∆fi,m ≥ 8 for all i and m ∈ Mi, then
λ2(fi, m)
(d)
≥ dSi + dXi − 2 + 2
√
(dSi − 1)(dXi − 1)(1− 1/(∆fi,m − 1))
dSidXi
(e)
≥ 1
dXi
(
1− 1
dSi
)
+
1
dSi
(
1− 1
dXi
)
(f)
≥ 1
max(dSi, dXi)
, (52)
where (d) is due to Lemma 54, (e) to ∆fi,m ≥ 8 and (f) is due to dS , dX ≥ 2. One thus obtains
for any 0 < δ < r2
logmax(dSi, dXi) ≥ min
m∈Mi
(− log λ2(fi, m)) ≥ (r2 − δ) log|Xi|,
where the first inequality is due to (52) and the second inequality holds for sufficiently large i
by (51). This completes the proof.
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d) Good BRI functions are nearly Ramanujan: The sufficient conditions of Lemmas 50
and 51 turn out to be strong restrictions on the BRI functions which can be applied.
Lemma 56. Let f : S × X → N be a BRI function with regularity set M. Assume there exists
a 0 < r < 1 and a 0 < δ < min(r, 1− r) such that
log|M|
log|X | ≥ 1− r − δ,
minm∈M(− log λ2(f,m))
log|X | ≥ r +
δ
2
. (53)
Then the largest nontrivial eigenvalue modulus of Gf,m is at most
√
dX |X |δ/2 for every m ∈M.
Proof. For any m ∈M
log λ2(f,m)
(a)
≤ −
(
r +
δ
2
)
log|X |
= (1− r − δ) log|X | −
(
1− δ
2
)
log|X |
(b)
≤ log|M| −
(
1− δ
2
)
log|X |,
where (a) is due to the right-hand side of (53) and (b) to the left-hand side of (53). In other
words
λ2(f,m) ≤ |M||X |1−δ/2 =
dS |M|
dS |X | |X |
δ/2 ≤ |X |
δ/2
dS
,
where the second inequality is due to (16). The largest nontrivial eigenvalue modulus of Gf,m
thus equals
√
dSdXλ2(f,m) ≤
√
dX |X |δ/2.
It is interesting to note that even though the graph degree in the BRI functions used in Lemmas
50 and 51 has to increase exponentially by Lemma 55, in contrast to the usual formulation of
the Alon-Boppana and Feng-Li bounds where it is fixed, (nearly) Ramanujan graphs can occur
in such a setting as well.
C. Eigenvalues vs. rate of BRI functions
The results of this section so far suggest that the larger |M|/maxm∈M λ2(f,m) for a BRI
function, the better rates are achievable for a wiretap channel. One can thus use the converse
for the wiretap channel capacity theorem to derive an asymptotic upper bound on the fraction
of |M| and maxm∈M λ2(f,m).
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Lemma 57. Let fi : Si × Xi → Ni be a sequence of BRI functions, the regularity set of fi
denoted by Mi, and with |Xi| increasing to infinity. Assume that there exists a 0 ≤ r < 1 such
that
lim
i→∞
log|Mi|
log|Xi| = 1− r.
Then
lim sup
i→∞
minm∈Mi(− log λ2(fi, m))
log|Xi| ≤ r.
Proof. Choose a sequence of BRI functions fi like in the statement and suppose the claim were
not true. By passing to a subsequence if necessary, one can without loss of generality assume
that there exists a 0 < δ < 1− r such that
lim
i→∞
minm∈Mi(− log λ2(fi, m))
log|Xi| > r + δ. (54)
Let A = {0, 1} and define T : A → A to be the noiseless binary channel, where T (a|a) = 1
for a ∈ A. Further, choose any p such that
1− r − δ < h(p) < 1− r, (55)
where h(p) = −p log p − (1 − p) log(1 − p) is the binary entropy of p. Define the channel
U : A → A to be the binary symmetric channel with flipping probability p, i.e.,
U(a|a) = 1− p, U(1 − a|a) = p
for all a ∈ A. By [44], the secrecy capacity of (T, U) is given by
max
P
(
I(P, T )− I(P, U)) = h(p),
where the maximum on the left-hand side is over probability distributions on A and the uniform
distribution Unif(A) is a maximizer. Thus this rate cannot be exceeded by any modular BRI
scheme.
To come to a contradiction, we proceed similarly to the proof of Lemma 50. Choose ni such
that
2ni−1 < |Xi| ≤ 2ni. (56)
fi determines a blocklength-ni wiretap code with encoder ξ(·|s,m) = f−1i,s (m) and decoder
ζ(s, y) = fs(y) for y ∈ Xi and given seed s. The error e(ξi, ζi) of (ξi, ζi) equals 0.
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Next we bound Lsem(ξi, ζi). For some δ
′ > 0 to be determined later, let γd = γd(δ
′, |A|) and
εi = 2
−nicδ′2 as in Lemma 48. Then for sufficiently large i and any m ∈Mi
Iεimax(U
ni) + log λ2(fi, m)
ni
(a)
≤ 1− h(p) + γd − − log λ2(fi, m)
log|Xi|
log|Xi|
ni
(b)
≤ 1− h(p)− (r + δ)ni − 1
ni
+ γd
= 1− r − δ − h(p)− r + δ
ni
+ γd, (57)
where (a) is due to the second part of Lemma 48 and the fact thatmaxP I(P, U) = I(Unif(A), U) =
1− h(p). (b) is due to (54) and (56). Therefore (57) is negative and bounded away from 0 for
sufficiently large i and sufficiently small δ′ by (55), hence Lsem(ξi, ζi) tends to zero at exponential
speed.
The rate of (ξi, ζi) is lower-bounded by
log|Mi|
ni
≥ log|Mi|
log|Xi|
ni − 1
ni
> h(p)
for sufficiently large i, where the first inequality is due to (56) and the second to the choice of
p and the assumption on log(|Mi|)/ log(|Xi|).
Thus one obtains a sequence of wiretap codes which asymptotically achieves a semantic
security rate strictly larger than h(p) on (T, U). This contradicts the fact that h(p) is the secrecy
capacity of (T, U). Therefore the assumption that a subsequence satisfying (54) for any δ > 0
exists must be wrong, and this completes the proof.
In view of the BRI functions constructed in the previous subsection, it is clear that the trade-off
derived in the lemma is tight.
VIII. CONCLUSION
A. Summary
It is shown that asymptotically, every rate achievable with strong secrecy is also achievable
with semantic security if the strong secrecy information leakage decreases sufficiently fast. If
the decrease is slow, this continues to hold if semantic security is given a weaker formulation
in terms of total variation distance instead of mutual information.
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BRI functions and modular BRI schemes are introduced. A bound quantifying the effect of
using the randomized inverse of a BRI function as a prefix to a channel on the secrecy of
message transmission is derived. It is shown that the seeded coset function can be converted into
a BRI function for suitable parameters. A general characterization of BRI functions in terms of
edge-disjoint connected biregular graphs is derived. This characterization is applied to construct
Ramanujan BRI functions.
It is shown that the secrecy rates of discrete and Gaussian wiretap channels are achievable by
modular BRI schemes and by ordinary wiretap codes constructed from modular BRI schemes. For
any sequence of BRI functions which in a modular BRI scheme achieves a positive asymptotic
rate for the discrete or Gaussian wiretap channel, the maximum degrees of the corresponding
graph families must grow exponentially in the blocklength. The wiretap coding theorem is applied
to show a trade-off between the size of the regularity set of a BRI function and the largest
associated second-largest eigenvalue modulus. The analysis of BRI functions also shows that
they are UHFs on average.
B. Practical aspects
BRI functions provide a universal method of enhancing error-correcting codes in order to
provide semantically-secure message transmission through a wiretap channel. By Theorem 39, it
only depends on the ε-smooth max-information of a channel by how much a given BRI function
can decrease the information leakage through this channel. Thus modular BRI schemes are robust
towards the channel model. In contrast, the polar wiretap code constructed by Liu, Yan and Ling
[33] is tailored to the Gaussian wiretap channel.
The polar wiretap code of [33] can be encoded and decoded efficiently. By efficiency, we
mean that the computations can be done in time polynomial in the blocklength. A modular
scheme is efficent if its components are, as already observed by Bellare and Tessaro [4] in the
case of modular UHF schemes. The conditions which ECCs have to satisfy in the context of
Lemmas 50 and 51 were discussed after Corollary 52. Efficient ECCs are known for the binary
symmetric and the Gaussian channel. For a BRI function f : S × X → N with regularity set
M, efficiency does not only mean the efficient computability of f(s, x) given s and x, but
also efficient invertibility, i.e., the efficient realization of the uniform distribution on the set
f−1s (m) for any message m and seed s. If f is defined by a graph family (Gf,m)m∈N , then the
computation of f(s, x) requires determining in which of the exponentially many graphs Gf,m
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the arguments s and x are adjacent. Efficiency of this process would mean that this is possible in
time polynomial in log|X |. This is harder than computing f−1s (m), since in this situation Gf,m
is determined by the message m.
The efficiency of the arithmetic seeded coset function βo was discussed in [40]. A seeded
coset BRI function needs four computational steps to be performed efficiently:
1) A mapping and its inverse from {0, 1}k−δ to M = {m ∈ N : F2b(m) = F2ℓ}, for
sufficiently large δ, to map binary sequences of data to the regularity set of β and back
again,
2) the uniform distribution on F2b for the calculation of β
−1
s (m),
3) multiplication on F∗
2ℓ
and
4) finding the m ∈ N which satisfies x ∈ F2ℓ +m, for the calculation of β(s, x).
We do not go into the discussion of these computational aspects.
Ramanujan BRI functions so far cannot be constructed efficiently. This would be desirable
even if the seeded coset BRI functions could be shown to be efficient, since the latter are only
available for a restrictive set of parameters. However, explicit constructions of Ramanujan graphs
known so far are also less flexible than the method of 2-lifts, and for a BRI function one needs a
whole edge-disjoint family of such graphs. One should expect the construction of such families
to get easier if one backs off a little bit from the best possible security rates and looks for good
edge-disjoint families of non-Ramanujan expanders. Some methods of constructing expanders
are presented in [28].
APPENDIX A
GRAPHS: DEFINITIONS AND FACTS
In this appendix, some definitions and facts from graph theory are collected as a reference.
Definition 58. A graph is a pair G = (X , E), where X is a finite set and E = E1 ∪ E2, where
E1 is a subset of {(x, x) : x ∈ X} and E2 is a subset of the set of 2-element subsets of X . The
elements of X are called vertices (singular: vertex) and the elements of E are called edges. An
element of E1 is also called a loop. Two elements x, x′ ∈ X are called adjacent if either x = x′
and (x, x) ∈ E1 or x 6= x′ and {x, x′} ∈ E2. If E = E2 (i.e., G has no loops), then G is called
simple.
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Fig. 4. A graph with three vertices and three edges, one of which is a loop.
Interpretation: A graph G can be drawn if it is not too big. Vertices are represented by dots
and edges by lines connecting these dots. Clearly, an edge which is a loop becomes a loop in
the drawing. See Figure 4.
Definition 59. A subgraph of a graph G = (X , E) is any graph G′ = (X ′, E ′) satisfying X ′ ⊂ X
and E ′ ⊂ E .
Definition 60. For every vertex x of the graph G = (X , E), its degree deg(x) is defined as
the number of vertices to which x is adjacent. If deg(x) = d is constant in x, then G is called
d-regular. In this case, d is called the degree of G.
Definition 61. The adjacency matrix of the graph G = (X , E) is an X ×X matrix whose (x, x′)
entry equals 1 if x and x′ are adjacent and 0 else.
Every adjacency matrix is symmetric. Therefore it can be diagonalized and has real eigenval-
ues.
Definition 62. Let G be a graph.
1) A sequence x1, . . . , xn of vertices of G is called a path if xξ is adjacent to xξ+1 for
0 ≤ ξ ≤ n− 1. In this case, x1 and xn are called the endvertices of the path.
2) A pair of vertices x, x′ is called connected if there exists a path with endvertices x and x′.
3) G is called connected if every pair of vertices is connected.
4) The distance of two vertices x, x′ is the length of any shortest path connecting x and x′.
If x, x′ are not connected, then their distance is set to +∞.
5) The diameter of G is the maximal distance between any two vertices of G.
Connectedness is an equivalence relation on the vertex set. The equivalence classes are called
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connected components. Between any two vertices contained in the same connected component,
there exists a path connecting the two vertices. If the two vertices are not contained in the same
connected component, no such path exists.
APPENDIX B
PROOFS OF LEMMAS
Proof of Lemma 22.
D(f‖g) = Zf
(
D
(
f
Zf
∥∥∥∥ gZg
)
+ log
Zf
Zg
)
≤ Zf
(
D2
(
f
Zf
∥∥∥∥ gZg
)
+ log
Zf
Zg
)
= Zf (D2(f‖g)− 2 logZf + logZg + logZf − logZg)
= Zf (D2(f‖g)− logZf)
where the inequality is due to the fact that D(·‖·) ≤ D2(·‖·) for probability densities [42].
Proof of Lemma 24. The all-one vector 1 is an eigenvector to the eigenvalue 1 of P , in other
words,
P1 = 1. (58)
We define the scalar product 〈·, ·〉X on RX by
〈u, v〉X = 1|X |
∑
x
u(x)v(x).
The norm induced by 〈·, ·〉X is denoted by ‖·‖X , in particular, 〈w,w〉X = ‖w‖2X . Note that
‖1‖X = 1. (59)
For any w ∈ RX write
w =
1
|X |
∑
x
w(x) = 〈w, 1〉X .
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Then
w⊤Pw =
|X |
|X |
∑
x
(Pw)(x)w(x)
= |X |〈Pw,w〉X
= |X |
[
〈P (w − w1), w − w1〉X + w〈Pw, 1〉X + w〈P1, w〉X − w2〈1, 1〉X
]
(a)
≤ |X |
[
λ2‖w − w1‖2X + w〈w, P1〉X + w〈1, w〉X − w2
]
(b)
= |X |
[
λ2‖w‖2X − 2λ2w〈w, 1〉X + λ2w2〈1, 1〉X + w〈w, 1〉X + w2 − w2
]
(c)
= |X |
[
λ2‖w‖2X − 2λ2w2 + λ2w2 + w2
]
= |X |
[
λ2‖w‖2X + (1− λ2)w2
]
= λ2
∑
x∈X
w(x)2 + (1− λ2)|X |
(
1
|X |
∑
x
w(x)
)2
≤ λ2
∑
x∈X
w(x)2 +
1
|X |
(∑
x
w(x)
)2
,
where (a) is due to the fact that w−w1 is orthogonal to the eigenspace of the eigenvector 1 and
the variational characterization of eigenvalues, to the symmetry of P and (58) and (59). In (b),
the binomial formula for ‖·‖2 was used, together with (58). (c) is a final application of (59).
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